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ABSTRACT
This thesis identifies and assesses the corporate
strategies adopted by the top defense companies as a result of
the new defense spending environment. The model used
throughout the thesis stipulates four corporate strategies:
expansion, diversification, globalization, and
rationalization. The thesis outlines the fundamental elements
of each strategy and highlights the significant actions taken
by the top defense companies. Finally, the factors that
framed the selection of these strategies are examined. The
compatibility between current skills and production
capabilities with market opportunities was the most
influential factor in strategy selection. Because of the lead
time resulting from backlogs and aggressive cost cutting, the
financial viability of the top defense companies is not at
risk. The thesis concludes that each of the strategies was
pursued to nearly the same degree and many of the companies
are pursuing multiple strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The United States has spent five decades building a
military that is capable of fighting a Soviet-led global war.
The Cold War could not have been won without a strong and
dedicated defense industrial base producing large numbers of
modernized weapons systems. Today the future of the defense
industrial base is clouded by budget reductions and the lack
of a credible threat.
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines the defense
industrial base as the capacity of industry to produce goods
and services that the DoD needs to meet its mission
requirements [Ref. l:p. 3]. It consists of tens of thousands
of firms varying in size, degree of diversification, and
product. The defense industrial base is a combination of
private-sector capabilities and military owned and operated
facilities such as shipyards and research and development
laboratories. Tomorrow's defense industrial base will depend
not only on government policies and DoD spending levels, but
on the financial strength of defense related firms, their
level of diversification, and their commitment to continue as
defense suppliers [Ref. 2:p. ES-lI.
The turning point for defense spending was in the mid-
1980s. Throughout the early 1980s the Pentagon's budget grew
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about five percent a year, after inflation, peaking at 371
billion FY1993 dollars in 1986. It has since tumbled 26
percent to $276 billion for FY1993. [Ref. 3:p. 84] This
spending drawdown is the result of various developments,
including the following: a general easing of tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union with the signing of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in December
1987; other agreements on reductions in strategic and
conventional arms; the growth of democracy throughout Eastern
Europe; deficit reduction initiatives such as the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollins law (GRH) of 1985t and a general uneasiness
concerning eroding American economic competitiveness [Ref.
2:p. 1-21. This new defense spending environment has created
much uncertainty and placed financial pressure on those
corporations that constitute the defense industrial base.
The United States is faced with competing demands for
scarce resources and pressure to spend the "Peace Dividend"
wisely. Defense spending must compete against domestic
spending and deficit reduction initiatives. In response to
the changing environment, companies in the defense sector need
to "downsize or rightsiie, get leaner and more flexible, all
the while preserving or strengthening their critical
technological edge." [Ref. 4:p. 100] Business reengineering
and restructuring have become a necessary survival tool for
even the largest companies.
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While the total demise of the defense sector has not
occurred, it remains in a state of flux. Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Loral Corporation, Bernard L.
Schwartz states that, "Whether you call it restructuring,
consolidating, or downsizing, the defense industry is reducing
its workforce by thousands, producing fewer products, and
closing plants at an extraordinary rate. Layoffs have
affected every state, every age group, and every level--blue
collar, white collar, uniformed, and civilian." [Ref. 5:p.
10] Yet the human toll cannot be measured simply by numbers.
Schwarz predicts that the short-term confusion over which
direction defense companies should travel will lead to program
stretch-outs and delays that waste taxpayers' money. This
ultimately leads to reduced technological innovation and lower
readiness. [Ref. 5:p. 10]
Current events in Somolia, Iraq, and Bosnia are constant
reminders of the importance of U.S. military readiness and the
industrial support needed to maintain that readiness. Past
wars and conflicts were not only won by soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and Marines--but by technology. The survival of the
defense industrial base is paramount to the security and
stability of the United States. What will the future hold?
Many analysts question the ability of the defense sector to
maintain its technological edge and operate profitably in the
future. Defense corporations have responded in many different
3
ways as they struggle to survive in this new era of economic
Darwinism.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to identify and assess the
corporate strategies that have evolved as a result of defense
force and budget reductions. This will be accomplished by
analyzing the financial and organizational impact of these
reductions on the U.S. defense industrial base. Subsidiary
research questions include the following:
1. What is the defense industry's scope of involvement
within the national economy?
2. What is the new defense spending environment facing
the defense industry?
3. What are the major strategies that will be employed in
the defense sector?
4. Which, if any, of these strategies is favored by the
defense sector? by Congress?
5. What are the limitations of each of the strategies?
6. To what extent will defense corporations pursue non-
defense commercial opportunities?
7. What factors shape the decisions and strategies taken
by defense contractors?
C. SCOPE
This thesis will examine the fifteen largest U.S. defense
contractors, as determined by their 1992 contract awards, and
their responses to the new defense budget environment. Table
1 provides a listing of those corporations that will be
examined in this thesis [Ref. 6:p. 34]. The data is supplied
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by Governments Executive's annual list of the top 100 defense
contractors. It should be noted that the list includes
General Motors (GM). Although GM's defense business is
conducted primarily by Hughes Electronics, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of GM, exclusion of GM's non-Hughes defense related
revenue would omit nearly $1 billion in GM defense revenue,
also placing it among the top 15. Most of this thesis will
refer to GM-Hughes Electronics. AT&T's annual defense sales
of $1.3 billion placed it among the top 15; however, they were
excluded from the study based on their extremely small
exposure to defense spending.
TABLE I: TOP 15 DEFENSE CONTRACTORS PER 1992 CONTRACT AWARDS
1992 defense U.S.
Company sales ($000s) market share
1. McDonnell Douglas $5,589,741 4.63%
2. Northrop 4,850,093 4-01
3. Lockheed 4,655,434 3.85
4. GM 4,558,227 3.77
5. General Electric 4,173,642 3.45
6. General Dynamics 3,450,463 2.86
7. United Technologies 3,087,484 2.56
8. Raytheon 2,843,316 2.35
9. Boeing 2,748,110 2.27
10. Martin Marietta 2,496,328 2.07
11. Litton Industries 2,317,691 1.92
12. Grumman 2,187,937 1.81
13. Loral 1,662,390 1.38
14. Rockwell International 1,266,643 1.05
15. Westinghouse Electric 1,238,402 1.03
Note: Rankings are based on prime contracts of $25,000 or
more for the Department of Defense
The defense industrial base consists of numerous other
diversified firms though restricting the analysis to 15 will
enable the thesis to focus on those companies who are prime
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contractors and have primary responsibility for developing and
designing major systems. These fifteen companies are also
representative of each of the major sectors within the defense
industry, i.e., aircraft/aerospace, missiles and space,
electronics, ships, and combat vehicles.
The most current data available is from 1992 and will be
used throughout this thesis. This thesis does not attempt to
address the myriad of potential government policies concerning
the defense industrial base. Such issues include regulation
of foreign investment and acquisition and increasing the
reliance on private sector research and development.
D. METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This thesis broadly classifies the major defense sector
strategies as expansion, diversification, globalization, and
rationalization. While this list is general in nature, it
provides an effective framework for classifying corporate
responses. These strategies are further defined in Chapter II
and individually addressed in subsequent chapters. Care was
taken to distinguish between short-term tactical maneuvers,
such as layoffs, plant closings, and debt reduction, and more
long-term strategic maneuvers. Although industry leaders
differ widely on how to best profit in the current
environment, the four strategy model developed in this thesis
covers each of the major approaches.
This thesis draws upon many different publications and
congressional studies. In particular, the 1991 DoD Report to
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Congress on the Defense Industrial Base and the 1992 Defense
Conversion Commission (DCC) Report entitled Adjusting to the
Drawdown help frame and guide this thesis. Extensive use was
also made of DRI/McGraw Hill (DRI) publications and the United
States Government Budget. DRI is the primary contributor to
the DCC regarding the impacts of the current drawdown on the
financial condition of the defense industrial base. The DCC
was created in April 1992 "to report on the effects of the
defense drawdown and make recommendations on Government
programs designed for facilitating the transition to
nondefense endeavors." [Ref. l:p. 1]
Corporate responses were researched using a combination of
current periodicals, investment reports, and corporate annual
reports. Once the major strategies were defined, the defense
companies were grouped into one or more of the four
strategies. Primary and secondary strategies were identified.
Trends and factors were examined to form an understanding as
to why specific strategies were taken. The advantages and
disadvantages of each strategy were analyzed and an evaluation
was made as to the overall fit of each company to its
strategy.
E. OUTLINE
The next chapter will examine the size and scope of the
defense industry and its importance to the military and
economic security of the United States. Topics include the
defense budget, procurement spending trends, and the new
7
defense industrial base. The common strategies taken by the
defense corporations will also be introduced prior to being
outlined in subsequent chapters. Each of the strategies and
factors that shaped them are then identified and evaluated.
The thesis will conclude with a summary and an overall
evaluation as to the fit between the strategies and the
factors that led to their adoption.
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11I. THE CURRENT EN VI RONM1ENT
A. DEFENSE SPENDING
1. BUDGET TRENDS
The purpose of this section is to gain an
understanding of the current defense spending environment.
Defense spending has proven to be cyclical throughout the
years. The defense drawdowns of the past have been reversed
due to new threats of communism. Figure 1 represents the
cycles that have repeated since World War I1 (Ref. 7 :0. 41.
The Cold War is clearly the major factor in the Korean,
Vietnam, and Reagan buildups.
SASQ' KoreaVVWIl -
S350 leagan 3uilduo
S250 V
S150
460 30 2 o 5 'S6 50 75 60 65 ;0  80 85 90 96
year
Figure 1: DoD Budget Trends Since World War 1I
(in FY 1992 $billion)
Many analysts and industry leaders question the
likelihood that defense spending will rebound once more in
light of the overall defeat of communism. They are
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forecasting little or no potential for future upswings. Those
companies who believe this assumption are less likely to
pursue growth strategies within the defense industry.
When compared to the reality of the defense budget,
planning for defense spending has been categorized as
overheated. Figure 2 shows projected versus actual defense
spending in constant 1992 dollars. The "fingers" at the top
of the chart represent various DoD five-year plans, while the
continuous line represents the actual budget. The dashed line
is the projected future budget. The shaded area represents
actual RDT&E and procurement spending- -the major revenue
sources for the defense industrial base. [Ref.7:p. 21
550
.- Projected
U m' 41 "- Actual
50.- Actual RT&E
0 Procurement
Ca s - (projected 92-96)
do , . 8 , 4 e8i; 68 o sz9;2 ,' i9
Figure 2: Actual Versus Projected DoD Budget Authority
Many of the companies in the defense sector expanded
in anticipation of the projected $400-$500 billion defense
budgets. The reality is that U.S. defense spending has
already contracted by over 22 percent in real terms since 1986
and is expected to be down nearly 54 percent by 1997 [Ref.
10
8:p. 16]. This has left many companies within the defense
industry burdened with •:cess capacity.
A better indicator of the new defense spending
environment is shown in Figure 3 [Ref. 9:p. 449]. The percent
real change in defense budget authority from the previous
year's budget authority is plotted, using zero as the basis.
The chart indicates that between 1985 and 1994, the cumulative
change is a 33.7 percent reduction in defense budget
authority. This reduction is expected to total 41.3 percent
by 1998. While the largest reductions appear to be in the
past, steady spending reductions continue to be forecasted for
the future.,
The current reduction in defense spending is actually
the mildest and most gradual in a half century. Table 2 helps
place the current drawdown in historical context. The table
presents both defense spending as a percent of gross domestic
product and outlays for national defense for four different
periods since World War II. The immediate post-World War II
period was the most rapid drawdown in history, as defense
outlays fell an average of 268.4 billion 1993 dollars per
year. Many industry analysts use this chart to illustrate
that the defense industrial base has rebounded even through
the tougher times of the past. [Ref. 10:p. 10]
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TABLE II: COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS AND CURRENT DRAWDOWNS
Defense Spending as a Percent al Gross Domestic Product
Peak Low Point Difference Average Change
Era Per Year
Year GOP % Year GDP % Years GDP % (Percentage)
wW ii 194 39.3 1948 3.7 4 35.6 8.90
Korea 1953 14.5 1956 10.. 3 4.3 1.43
Vietnam 1968 9.6 197- 4.3 10 4., 0.48
Current 1986. 6.5 1997 3.6 11 •2.9 025
Outlays for National Defense (billions of 1993 dollars)
Peak Low Point Difference Average Change
Era Per Year
Year Outlays Year Outlays Years Outlays (OutlaTs)
ww a 1945 S85.7 1948 $0.4 3 805.3 268.4
Korea 1953 390.7 1956 284.5 3 106.2 35.4
Vietnam 1968 371.2 977, 219.1 9 152.1 16.9
Current 1989 353.6 1997 256.9 3 96.7 12.1
Note: Includes all national defense spending, including
Department of Energy defense activities
Source: Logistics Management Institute, From War to Peace:
History of P.as Conversions, January 1993. Also,
Budget of the United States Government. FY 1993,
S, February 1992.
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Figure 4 breaks out the specific reductions in outlays
by spending category from 1987 to 1997. Procurement and
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), major
sources of revenue for the defense industry, are taking
substantial reductions. Combined, the two take $56 billion
out of a total $101 billion in cuts, or 56 percent of the
total for this time period. Procurement outlays will be the
hardest hit--falling 46 percent or $46 billion since. 1987.
The next section of this thesis continues the analysis of the
new environment by examining procurement trends more closely.
[Ref. l:p. 8]
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January 1.993.
Figu~re 4: Reductions in Outlays by Spending Category
1987 to 1997
2. Procurement and RDT&E Spending Trends
The component of defense spending that most directly
affects the defense industrial base is procurement. DoD
procurement falls into three categories: weapon systems,
dual-use items that have both defense and commercial
applications, and commercial items such as office and medical
supplies, and food and clothing [Ref. 10:p. 61. While
procurement accounted for nearly 30 percent of defense outlays
in FY 1987, it is projected to decline to 25 percent by FY
1994 [Ref. 2:p. 2-2].
Figure 5 provides a short-term perspective on DoD
procurement spending. This chart compares levels of spending
for procurement in the 1990s to peak mid-1980 levels. The
critical component of this chart is the declining obligated
balance or backlog. Obligated balances are the cushion that
will soften the impact of procurement declines for defense
contractors. This is especially critical in such industries
as shipbuilding and combat vehicles which are heavily
dependent upon defense sales. The shipbuilding backlog is
expected to maintain current operating levels for several
years. These backlogs give defense companies time to
strengthen their financial situation, seek alternative sources
of revenues, and further refine their strategies. [Ref. 2:p.
2-31
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procurement budgets cut in half from peak 1985 levels. This
decline in procurement will hamper che defense industrial base
in its ability to maintain high technology prcduc-.s, support
current, systems, and meet surge production. [Ref. 2:p. ES-3]
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Figure 7: Budget Reductions in Major Procurement Categories
The second major component of defense spending that
impacts the defense industrial base is RDT&E. DoD spending in
RDT&E has been critical in maintaining American technological
advantages, developing new technology, and sharpening the
skills of the American worker. Many of the companies
evaluated in this thesis participate in critical technology
areas such as semiconductors, radars, passive sensors, and
propulsion. Since 1-985, RDT&E budget authority has steadily
increased from $31,327 million 1993 dollars to $38,813 million
in FY1993 (Ref. II: p.78]. A significant amount of money
continues to be put into such programs as the F-22, F/A-18E/F,
and the MZLSTAR satellite. It is anticipated that DoD will
continue to support such levels of spending.
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The spending trends just examined play a critical role
in shaping the various corporate responses to the new
environment. As this spending trend continues, DoD is
struggling to determine the appropriate level and kind of
support it will provide to sustain the defense industrial
base. Regardless of the DoD policy, what this austere
spending environment is producing is a new defense industrial
base--which is the focus of the next section.
B. THE NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
Due to the historic cyclical nature of defense spending,
the contraction of the defense industrial base has not
surprised everyone. Others are more concerned. Although the
world is much different today than during the years of the
Reagan defense build-up, the United States continues to be
called upon for world leadership. Although this defense
builddown is small by historical standards, it comes at a time
when our economy is not growing as rapidly as it was during
earlier cutbacks. Combined with stiffer competition from
abroad, the new defense industrial base must respond
differently.
At its height, the business of national defense employed
6.7 million people--5.6 percent of the labor force. Since
1989, 440,000 defense industry workers have been laid off, as
well as 300,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and 100,000 DoD
employees. This far exceeds the combined cutbacks at GM, IBM,
AT&T, and Sears over the same period. A Federal Reserve study
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estimates that layoffs between 1987 and 1997 could total 2.6
million. [Ref. 3:p. 841
What has developed is a period of economic Darwinism. The
defense industry is undergoing a dynamic period of
consolidation and restructuring. Today, a dozen companies
compete in more than six defense market segments, from
aircraft to combat vehicles. Tomorrow they will be forced to
concentrate on two or three segments. In 1992 there were 13
and 16 companies competing in the space and avionics segments,
respectively. DRI is predicting consolidation to five or six
companies in each group by the end of the decade. [Ref. 10:p.
31] Analysts at Booz, Allen, and Hamilton estimate that 75 to
85 percent of the top 100 defense companies or divisions that
remain could be gone by the year 2000 [Ref. 4:p. 94].
Combined with a seven percent national unemployment rate
and a sluggish global economy, the military drawdown
exacerbates recession, hampers recovery, and weakens the
balance sheets of defense companies. The Americans for
Democratic Action, a Washington D.C. -based think-tank, and the
AFL-CIO are urging Congress to spend more money creating jobs
for displaced workers and new markets for defense contractors.
In addition, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense has
been tasked with developing a coherent approach to preserving
the defense industrial base. His efforts range from
prioritizing weapons systems to reviewing military
specifications. [Ref. 12: p. 31]
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The primary DoD approach to the new environment is to let
market forces prevail. This policy has its roots in the
Reagan and Bush Administration. The 1991 Economic Report to
the President, written by Bush's Council of Economic Advisers
and sent to Congress in February 1991, reads, "The U.S.
economy has had little trouble bouncing back from sharp
declines in defense spending and any efforts to protect
companies from market forces would restrain the economy's
natural evolution." [Ref. 13: p. 4] The report cited the
years 1944-47, when defense spending fell from 41 percent of
GNP to 4 percent, as an example of successful adjustment.
Proponents of this view believe that current cuts in
defense spending levels are not dangerous to the economy.
These analysts note that $190 billion is scheduled to be spent
on RDT&E between FY1993 and FY1997 (14 percent of the DoD
budget) and procurement expenditures during the same period
are projected to total more than $300 billion (22 percent of
the DoD budget) [Ref. 14:p. 48].
This approach is not without its critics, namely those
executives and managers within the major defense corporations.
Bernard Schwartz, Chairman and CEO of Loral Corporation, the
leading defense electronics firm, seems to echo the sentiments
of others in the defense industry. He states that, "Free
market restructuring is often motivated by profit.. .with
little regard for long-term investment, or performance, or
serving the country's national security needs." (Ref. 15:p. 1]
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Others worry about the ability of industry to reconstitute
such critical technologies as nuclear propulsion in times of
national crisis. In general, critics of the free market
approach argue that American security is at risk as a result
of the current drawdown in defense spending and its impact on
the defense industry.
Recently, the Clinton Administration has shown signs of
rejecting the past laissez-faire approach to the defense
industry. President Clinton's industrial policy proposes
helping certain defense contractors and easing antitrust
regulation of defense contractors [Ref. 16:p. D1]. The recent
recommendation, subject to approval by Congress, to build a
third Seawolf submarine is an example of such a policy.
General Dynamics' Electric Boat division is clearly the
beneficiary of such a recommendation.
However, critics argue that bureaucrats should not and
cannot "pick winners and losers" in industry. These critics
want market forces, not the government, to guide conversion
and consolidation within the defense industry. Regardless of
the extent of involvement by the government, the new defense
industrial base will be smaller as it continues its path
through this dynamic time period. [Ref. 16:p. Dl]
Al Hanna, Director of the Management Consulting Firm
McKinsey and Company, Inc., Stamford, Connecticut, stated, "As
companies in the industry struggle to survive, all of them
will be either unprofitable on an outright basis or achieve
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returns on capital too low to make them viable." [Ref. 13:p.
86] Since those comments in 1991, the defense industry has
proved him wrong. Why? These companies have reengineered,
streamlined operations, and developed successful strategies
for guiding them through the new environment. The following
section provides an introduction into the strategies employed
by the new defense industrial base.
C. CORPORATE STRATEGIES
The companies within the defense sector have set goals
such as improving operating margins, increasing shareholder
value, and positioning for economic recovery. Short-term
tactical decisions such as layoffs, reducing capital
expenditures, and reducing debt are efforts to meet these
goals. However, the success or failure of these companies is
dependent on more long-term strategic decisions. Throughout
the remaining chapters of this thesis, a strategic matrix
developed by General Dynamics will be used to analyze these
strategies.
The matrix is shown in Figure 8 and guides decisions
regarding strategy and product line investment. On the
horizontal axis is the competitive position of the business,
while the vertical axis measures the attractiveness of its
market. William Anders, Chairman and CEO of General Dynamics,
describes competitive advantage as low costs, good experience,
and leading technology. It is a subjective measure relative
to the competition. Market attractiveness includes such
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factors as market growth, potential profit margins, and risks.
Each band within the matrix suggests how to invest and manage
a business. (Ref. 7:p. 8]
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Figure 8: The General Dynamics Strategic Matrix
According to Anders, defense ranks low in terms of market
attractiveness. However, the competitive position and
opportunity to compensate for reduced military business vary
not only from defense sector to defense sector, but from
company to company. The matrix indicates that only the
strongest defense companies should maintain their current
investment in defense and none should expand.
The model in this thesis stipulates four corporate
strategies: expansion, diversification, globalization, and
rationalization. These strategies are represented by various
points on the matrix. The expansion strategy is represented
as the invest and grow portion of Anders' matrix.
Diversification is the most common strategy and is a variation
of the invest and grow approach. Companies which follow this
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strategy expand into new commercial markets which are
predicted to grow in order to replace lost DoD revenues.
Alternatively, defense companies can maintain their current
defense position by globalizing or increasing exports to
replace lost DoD sales. Finally, managing for cash reflects
reduction of a company's businesses through a strategy of
rationalizing, or divesting non-core businesses. Although
exiting the market completely is an option, government
policies and procurement regulations tend to inhibit this
option, especially for the larger defense companies.
Several companies are pursuing a policy of expansion.
These companies believe in the cyclical nature of military
spending and are betting that by acquiring a larger stake in
key defense businesses now they will become dominant players
later. This strategy is particularly attractive to smaller
electronics and avionics companies whose components are
critical to the Pentagon's strategy of modernization. Loral
and Martin Marietta are the industry leaders in this strategy.
Since 1987, Loral has spent $1.8 billion buying six high-tech
military electronics businesses, including Ford Aerospace and
LTV's missile division. In November 1992, Martin Marietta
acquired General Electric's aerospace business, which
generated over $6 billion in sales in 1992. (Ref. 3:p. 95]
Diversification, or evolution into nondefense businesses,
is the strategy favored by most defense companies and is also
promoted by Congress. Many companies are moving in this
26
direction and attempting to take advantage of their
comparative advantage in similar commerical markets. For
example, Martin Marietta hopes to get 50 percent of its
revenues from nondefense businesses by 1997 and has been
moving into postal sorLing machines, environmental robotics,
construction materials, and rock quarries. Northrop recently
developed a commercial aircraft division. It bought a 49
percent stake in Vought, a maker of civilian and military
aircraft structures, from LTV Corporation for $47 million.
General Motors - Hughes Electronics is also pursuing such a
strategy. By 1994 it will have invested $500 million in the
HS601 satellite, a direct broadcasting service which will
compete with cable television. [Ref. 4:p. 99]
The third major strategy is globalization. As domestic
spending decreases, more corporations are turning to foreign
military sales. The United States share of the world market
and volume of arms sales continues to rise. In 1992, the U.S.
exported $13.6 billion in arms to the developing world, or 3
1/2 times its closest competitor--France. This amount is 136
times the amount exported by China. The U.S. accounted for 57
percent of all sales to the developing world in 1992. [Ref.
17:p. 10)
While most corporations are pursuing this strategy to a
certain extent, United Technologies (UT) has pursued this
avenue most aggressively. UT's Pratt and Whitney Division was
selected to supply Taiwan with $500 million worth of FI00-PW-
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220 engines for F-16A/B fighter jets, and is computing for
another order worth approximately $600 million for engine to
power F-15s for Saudi Arabia (Ref. 18:p. 3].
General Dynamics is following a strategy that Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer William Anders calls
rationalization. It is a combination of downsizing and
consolidating. He defends his strategy as one of "managing
for cash" vice liquidation. Anders does not believe the
cyclical upswing in defense spending will return and is
concentrating only on his businesses' core competencies.
Anders also refers to his policy as "rightsizing". Since
1991, General Dynamics has sold off nearly $3 billion of its
assets, including its prized tactical air division in Fort
Worth. [Ref. 4:p. 94]
Conversion to flexible production lines is a strategy that
will become part of nearly all corporate cultures and is
therefore not treated as a separate category. The future of
defense spending is in limited production runs of customized
items that are more responsive to the Pentagon's needs. This
requires flexibility by the defense sector. Fewer numbers
will be ordered of more technologically advanced items.
Daniel Pinick, President of Boeing's Defense Division states:
Conversion won't be to new products. It will be
conversion from rigid hard-tool production lines to soft-
tooled, flexible machines and agile teams that can build
more than one thing without facility changes. [Ref. 3:p.
96]
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Flexible manufacturing is intended to reduce current
trends in increasing unit costs, lengthening lead times, and
program delays. It is intended to improve product design,
reduce inventories, smooth the manufacturing process, and
shorten turnaround times. Efficiency, flexibility, and cost
cutting are the keys to future success within the industry.
[Ref. 2:p. 5-2]
Some companies will pursue more than one of the four
strategies discussed above and different divisions within a
company may lie at different points in the General Dynamics
matrix. However, each company within the defense industrial
base is guided by a primary strategy, while the others are
secondary in size and scope. While no one single strategy is
necessarily correct, the strategy chosen by the company must
be consistent with the underlying factors that have shaped the
company, its current market position, and its corporate
culture. The remainder of this thesis will look at each of
the strategies and the factors that are molding the
development and execution of these strategies by the top
defense companies in the United States.
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III. EXPANSION--IN SEARCH OF MARKET SHARE
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE EXPANSION STRATEGY
Many of the companies in the defense sector believe in the
cyclical nature of military spending and are betting that by
acquiring a larger stake in key defense businesses now they
will become dominant players later. Expansion enables
companies to capitalize on their current strengths and core
defense capabilities. An important element in the process of
consolidation within the defense industry, expansion is the
complementary strategy of downsizing. This chapter of the
thesis will outline the basic elements of the strategy, its
advantages, and the barriers to implementation. Succeeding
sections will focus on the companies that are pursuing the
expansion strategy and the factors that guided management's
decision to pursue such a strategy.
William Anders states that, "Beyond a few niches, in
general there are no real 'Invest & Grow' opportunities in
defense." [Ref. 7 :p. 8] Given the general unattractiveness
of the defense market, Figure 9 rejects expansion within the
defense industry [Ref. 7:p. 8]. However, according to JSA
International, a consulting firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
259 defense contractors have sold out to stronger or better
positioned rivals since 1985 [Ref. 4:p.941. As this chapter
will illustrate, there are areas within the defense industry
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where expansion is and will continue to be an intelligent
strategy.
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Figure 9: The General Dynamics Strategic Matrix
Martin Marietta Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Norman Augustine, is a strong proponent of the expansion
strategy and believes the current drawdown is not permanent.
Given the difficult environment facing the defense industry
today, he wants a company whose management is totally focused
on defense. In today's environment, defense companies must
share pieces of a shrinking pie. Augustine wants to buy
bigger pieces. Addressing the issue of corporate
acquisitions, he skeptically states:
There is good news and bad news. The bad news is that 75
percent of all acquisitions fail. The good news is that
20 percent don't make any difference at all. (Ref. 19:p.
23]
Why is this strategy even considered, given the current
market conditions and past failures? Consolidation is not an
option but a requirement in mature industries such as defense.
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Margaret Blair, a research associate and economist at the
Brookings Institute, says that takeovers, mergers, and
consolidation occur when an industry nears the end of a growth
cycle. She writes:
Very often, takeovers are an institutional mechanism for
achieving consolidation when consolidation is needed.
The signal that consolidation is needed is that there is
not enough growth, not enough profits to go around for
the industry to sustain all companies. (Ref. 20:p. 44]
Assuming the company survives the downturn in defense
spending, an effective strategy will enable the company to
strengthen and improve its competitive advantage. William
Anders outlines the major advantages of expansion as
rightsizing, repositioning, and restructuring. Rightsizing
increases the efficiency of the company by reducing internal
excess capacity. Repositioning puts resources where they can
be efficiently used and eliminates costly and duplicate R&D
efforts. Restructuring increases the financial strength of
the company. [Ref. 7:p. 10]
As the number of mergers and acquisitions increases, fears
of losing plant capacity and production capability, as well as
reducing the level of competition, have triggered political
interest. Reduced competition has sparked fears of monopolies
and higher prices. However, Thomas L. McNaughter, a fellow at
Brookings Institute, argues that excessive competition within
the defense industry is not always good and that an expansion
strategy can actually be beneficial. Since only one
competitor will win a contract, additional competitors will be
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forced to reduce their investment since their chances of
winning are decreased. He maintains that limiting competition
maintains high levels of investment and sustains the high
degree of innovation. [Ref. 20:p. 461
Antitrust laws within the United States regulate the level
of competition within industry. Last year's rejection of the
proposed merging of two fina. cially troubled armored vehicle-
makers, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. and Olin Corporation, was a
major setback for proponents of the expansion strategy.
However, recent initiatives point towards an easing of
antitrust enforcement against the defense industry. Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin wants to encourage mergers and
acquisitions so defense companies can focus on core operations
and reduce costs, thus saving the government money. [Ref.
16:p. D1]
Contrary to Aspin's desires, the Clinton Administration is
reversing a decade-long Republican easing of antitrust laws.
The traditional Democratic school believes that government
should take an active role in protecting the American
consumer. Under Presidents Reagan and Bush, the market was
believed to control would-be monopolists. However, a new
school of thought is developing. Charles Rule, a former
Reagan antitrust chief, states, "... [the new faction] believes
antitrust laws often prevent good market arrangements and
various beneficial forms of cooperation." [Ref. 21:p. 1]
Anne Bingaman, assistant Attorney General for Antitrust under
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President Clinton, has publicly stated her opposition to
antitrust exemptions [Ref. 16:p. Dl].
As the government searches for an official position on the
issue, defense companies continue to acquire and merge with
new business units and companies. The next section of the
thesis will highlight the most significant events within the
industry with regards to expansion. The final section will
examine the factors that shaped the strategy.
B. DEFENSE COMPANIES IN PURSUIT OF EXPANSION
Table III provides a list of those companies pursuing an
expansion strategy. General Motors - Hughes Electronics,
Lockheed, Loral, and Martin Marietta are pursuing expansion as
their primary strategy in adapting to the new defense spending
environment. Litton Industries and Raytheon are following a
strategy of expansion to a more limited degree, relying
primarily upon diversification into commercial markets.
TABLE III: DEFENSE COMPANIES PURSUING AN EXPANSION STRATEGY
Expansion Strategy
Primary Secondary
GM-Hughes Electronics Litton Industries
Lockheed Raytheon
Loral
Martin Marietta
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1. GK-Rughes Zlectronics
General Motors (GM) is not only the world's largest
automobile manufacturer, it is also one of the nation's
leading producers of defense products. Substantially all of
GM's defense business is conducted by GM-Hughes Electronics
Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, that includes
the Hughes Aircraft Company. The 1992 acquisition of General
Dynamics' missile division for $450 million makes GM-Hughes
Electronics one of the nation's premier missile builders,
along with Raytheon. Currently consolidated into GM-Hughes
Electronics' Tucson, Arizona facility, the acquisition
exploits the company's strengths in missile and guidance
system production. The company has also announced that it is
negotiating with McDonnell Douglas concerning the purchase of
its missile division. [Ref. 22:p. 21 GM-Hughes Electronics
is currently the nation's largest defense electronics
contractor and is continuing to expand its market share.
2. Lockheed
For more than 30 years Lockheed has been a provider of
space, missile, surveillance, and communications systems to
the Department of Defense. The $1.5 billion acquisition of
General Dynamics' Fort Worth Division, producer of tactical
fighter aircraft including the F-16, creates a $6.5 billion a
year aeronautical business--making Lockheed one of the world's
premier military aircraft producers (Ref. 23:p. 6]. The new
company is called Lockheed Fort Worth and includes General
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Dynamics' one-third share in the F-22 program; the F-16
fighter program (which has a $6 billion backlog); the FS-X (a
joint venture between Japan and the U.S. to develop an F-16
derivative); various other military electronics and special
programs; and excludes any liabilities that may result from
Fort Worth's aborted A-12 attack bomber program [Ref. 23:p.
18].
The acquisition is expected to increase the
efficiencies of Lockheed's troubled F-22 program by optimizing
the utilization of the company's resources. The F-16 program,
a favorite of foreign governments, also positions the company
well for further expansion in the international market. The
acquisition is estimated to add $.25 to this year's earnings
per share and upwards of $.50 in subsequent years [Ref. 24:p.
566].
3. Loral
A high-tech defense electronics firm, Loral has been
the leader in the expansion strategy with several major
acquisitions in recent years. The acquisition of Goodyear
Aerospace from Goodyear Tire and Rubber in 1987, Time
Microwave in 1990, and the advanced simulator business of Bolt
Beranek and Newman, Inc. in 1993, all strengthened Loral's
market share in electronics. The biggest developments were
the 1990 acquisition of Ford Aerospace from the Ford Motor
Company and the 1992 acquisition of LTV Corporation's missile
business. Both acquisitions position the company well to
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rival the strength of GM-Hughes Electronics in the electronics
sector.
Effective October 1, 1990, Loral Aerospace Holdings,
Inc. ("Loral Aerospace"), a corporation jointly owned by Loral
Corporation and the Merchant Banking Partnership affiliated
with Shearson Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., acquired Ford
Aerospace from the Ford Motor Company. At the completion of
the initial agreement, Loral owned 51.5 percent and the
Merchant Banking Partnership 48.5 percent. In June 1992,
Loral agreed to buy the Merchant Banking remaining equity in
Loral Aerospace. This transaction gives Loral complete
ownership of all the businesses acquired from Ford Motor
Company, with the exception of Space Systems/Loral, a Loral
Aerospace subsidiary, in which the partnership will continue
to be an equity partner. (Ref. 25:pp. 6,32]
In an effort to better position itself for further
acquisitions, Loral restructured its debt in 1992. Loral paid
off $100 million of debt due in 2010 and replaced it with $300
million of new long-term debt at favorable interest rates.
The company also increased its revolving bank line to $600
million. These adjustments take advantage of favorable market
conditions by cutting its borrowing costs and providing more
credit for future growth and expansion. Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer Bernard Schwartz estimates that the debt
restructuring will add five cents to their earnings per share
in 1993. [Ref. 26:p. 38]
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4. Martin Marietta
A diversified defense and commercial products company,
Martin Marietta's "Peace Dividend Strategy" calls for
"expanding our defense business by capitalizing on areas of
technological leadership and playing an active role in the
current period of industry consolidation." [Ref. 27:p. 3] In
the past several years, Martin Marietta has looked at as many
as 100 companies to come up with a list of six to eight
possible acquisitions for further consideration (Ref. 28:p.
32]. In October 1993, Martin Marietta agreed to buy General
Dynamics' space business
In early 1992, Martin Marietta was outbid by Loral in
the acquisition of LTV Corporation's missile division. In
November 1992, Martin Marietta announced a $3.5 billion merger
with General Electric Aerospace (GE Aerospace) - -the largest
merger of the post-Cold War era. Approved in April 1993, the
Martin Marietta-GE Aerospace merger is referred to as "a
milestone--or a catalyst that will drive the industry further
into consolidation." [Ref. 29:p. 23] The merger enables
Martin Marietta to better compete with Loral and Lockheed,
major competitors in the satellite and defense electronics
segments. GE received $2.05 billion in cash and an additional
$1 billion in new convertible preferred stock, as well as two
seats on Martin Marietta's board of directors [Ref. 29:p. 23].
GE Aerospace is a world-class developer of such products as
spacecraft, radar and sonar systems, communication systems,
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simulation systems, fire control systems, missile system
components, and automated test systems.
5. Litton Industries and Raytheon
Although secondary to their principal strategy of
diversifying into commercial markets, Litton Industries and
Raytheon are also pursuing a limited expansion strategy. The
1991 acquisition of General Instrument's Defense Systems Group
enhanced Litton's position in the defense electronics market.
Raytheon also strengthened its position in the electronics
market with purchases of Applied Remote Technology from
General Dynamics in 1993 and AMBER Engineering, Inc. in 1992.
Applied Remote Technology is a supplier of advanced unmanned
underwater vehicles and sensor systems, and AMBER designs and
produces a wide variety of infrared components and focal plane
arrays [Ref. 30:p. 6].
Although the General Dynamics strategic matrix suggested
that expansion was not an appropriate strategy for defense
companies, it is clear that several defense companies are
aggressively pursuing such an option. Although not intended
to be all inclusive, Table IV provides a summary of the major
expansion highlights. The next section will examine the
factors that have shaped the evolution of the expansion
strategy.
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TABLE IV: DEFENSE INDUSTRY EXPANSION HIGHLIGHTS
General Motors-Hughes Electronics
1993: -Begins talks with McDonnell Douglas concerning
potential purchase of missile division
1992: -Acquires General Dynamics' missile division
1989: -Acquires the Electro-Optics division of the
Perkin-Elmer Corporation
Litton Industries
1992: -Acquires GI's defense systems group
Lockheed
1993: -Acquires General Dynamics' fighter plane division
1992: -Bids for LTV Corporation's missile division
1991: -Acquires M.E.L. Defense Systems Ltd from Phillips
Electronics Ltd
Loral Corporation
1993: -Acquires the advanced simulator business of Bolt
Beranek & Newman, Inc.
1992: -Acquires LTV Corporation's missile business
-Acquires Librascope Corporation and Loral Sonar
Systems Corporation
-Purchases remaining 41% equity in Loral Aerospace
(formerly Ford Aerospace)
-Restructures debt to gain flexibility for future
expansion
1990: -Acquires Ford Aerospace from Ford Motor Company
1989: -Acquires Electro-Optics Division of Honeywell,Inc.
1987: -Acquires Goodyear Aerospace from Goodyear Tire &
Rubber
Martin Marietta
1993: -Agrees to buy General Dynamics' space business
-Merges with GE Aerospace
1992: -Bids for LTV Corporation's missile division
Raytheon
1993: -Acquires Applied Remote Technology
1992: -Acquires AMBER.Engineering, Inc.
Source: Wall Street Journal Index
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C. FACTORS SHAPING STRATEGY SELECTION
The purpose of this section is to analyze the factors that
have shaped the expansion strategy within the defense sector.
These factors are illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 10.
After considering the company's exposure to defense spending,
the company must evaluate the market segment or niche within
which the company operates, the compatibility or synergism
that the new unit or business has with the existing technology
and assets, and the company's financial strength. Although
certain factors will indicate whether a company should or can
expand, the interaction of all factors is the final
determinant in strategy selection.
1. Exposure to Defense Spending
In formulating the corporate strategy, the defense
company must first consider its current exposure to defense
spending. The companies that are highly exposed to defense
spending are likely to further expand. Companies with more
exposure are oriented towards government unique accounting
practices, standards and specifications, and audit and
oversight roles, thus making their strategy selection less
flexible. The less the exposure to defense spending, the
easier it is for companies to offset lost defense revenues or
exit the defense market completely.
Table V lists the top DoD contractors based on 1991
defense and space revenues as a percentage of total revenues
[Ref. 10:p. 60]. Of the eleven companies in the extremely
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Factor 1
To what extent is Moderate Seek alternative
company exposed to strategy
defense spending? Low
Extreme/High
Factor 2
Is market segment NO Seek alternative
growing? strategy
YES
Factor 3
Does technology of new NO Look at other
business unit complement companies/business
existing business? units
YES
Factor 4
Do I have financial NO Improve profitability
strength to fund of current businessexpansion?I
YES
[E EXPAND /ACQU IRE /ME!2GE I
Figure 10: Factors Framing the Expansion Strategy
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or highly exposed categories, six have actively pursued an
expansion strategy. Those companies which are more modestly
exposed are pursuing alternative strategies.
TABLE V: EXPOSURE TO DEFENSE SPENDING
Company Percent Category
Grumman 90.8 Extremely Exposed
Northrop 89.6
Martin Marietta 85.6
Lockheed 85.0
General Dynamics 84.6
Loral 75.3
McDonnell Douglas 55.1 Highly Exposed
Raytheon 53.9
GM-Hughes Electronics 49.6
Litton Industries 46.9
Rockwell 43.6
United Technologies 25.9 Moderately Exposed
Westinghouse Electric 25.4
Boeing 19.9
General Electric 12.3 Minimally Exposed
Note: Percent = 1991 defense and space revenues as a
percentage of total revenues
Source: DRI/McGraw-Hill
Despite being extremely exposed to defense spending,
Grumman and General Dynamics are both downsizing. Facing
declining aerospace revenues and mature defense programs,
Grumman will focus on cash generation and its defense
electronics business. General Dynamics is trying to achieve
critical mass in its two remaining core businesses- -armored
vehicles and nuclear submarines. Northrop and Boeing are the
only manufacturers producing strategic bombers in the United
States and both face a shrinking defense market. Facing
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severe cutbacks in its B-2 productic;•, Northrop is pursuing
diversification into commercial markets.
Exposure to defense spending is a key factor in the
strategic decision-making process. Those companies with
higher exposure are more likely to expand, assuming the
remaining factors also fit. However, as seen in Lhe case of
Grumman, General Dynamics, and Northrop, the market sector the
company participates in is of even greater importance.
2. Market Sector Growth Opportunities
Companies must also determine whether the markets they
participate in offer sufficient opportunities for future
revenue growth. Companies whose strengths are in these growth
markets are more inclined to expand their defense exposure.
Based on the Pentagon's September 1993 five-year defense plan,
the emphasis will not be on new weapons platforms, but in the
upgrading and modification of existing platforms. This
emphasis creates market niches that include precision
ammunitions and electronic, avionic, and communication gear.
[Ref. 12:p. 94]
In October 1992, then Governor Clinton also pledged his
support for products that are mobile and technologically
superior. He emphasized programs such as electronics, fast
sealift ships, and the F-22. Clinton stated:
We will give top priority to research and development
funding both to keep the edge of basic research and to
produce the best weapons and equipment focused on the
defense technologies of the future: sensors, surveillance,
guidance, materials, communications, and intelligence.
[Ref. 31:p. 10]
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The defense electronics industry provides the greatest
growth prospects, given this set of priorities. While
procurement in the aircraft sector is expected to
significantly decline, the defense electronics industry will
experience a more modest decline in procurement and RDT&E
spending over the next four years. The Electronics Industries
Association predicts that procurement spending in the
electronics and communications sector will decline by $500
million in constant dollars between FY 1993-97, compared to
$3.3 billion for aircraft procurement. [Ref. 10:pp. 9-11)
Table VI provides a list of the top 15 defense
companies which derive greater than 25 percent of their total
revenues from business segments involved in defense
electronics. Rockwell and Westinghouse Electric have both
chosen to diversify into commercial markets rather than
expand. Rockwell's main defense projects such as the B-1
bomber, Shuttle Orbiter, and the MX Missile are fully mature
and the company sees more attractive opportunities in
commercial electronics [Ref. 32:p. 58]. Westinghouse Electric
has been suffering financial losses in its Westinghouse
Financial Services subsidiary and does not have the financial
strength to expand. As a result, Westinghouse has been
concentrating on liquidating its troubled assets and improving
profitability [Ref. 32:pp. 86-87].
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TABLE VI: EXPOSURE TO DEFENSE ELECTRONICS ($million)
Company Business Segment Revenue Percent
Loral Defense Electronics $2,882 100.0
Raytheon Electronics 4,976 54.9
GM-Hughes Defense Electronics 5,353 43.5
Rockwell Electronics 4,620 42.3
Martin Marietta Electronics,Information
and Missiles 2,473 40.0
Litton Industries Advanced Electronics 1,957 34.0
Westinghouse Electric Electronic Systems 2,788 33.0
Note: Percent = 1992 business segment revenue as a percentage
of total revenue
Source: 1992 Annual Reports
With the exception of Lockheed's expansion in the
tactical aircraft market, most expansion is occurring in the
defense electronics sector. Those companies which can take
advantage of the new set of DoD priorities are participants in
the electronics sector. However, expansion must also ensure
new segments or business units complement existing core
business capabilities.
3. Existing Core Competencies
Expansion into new market segments or merging with new
business units must be done in a manner which reinforces
strengths and core business capabilities. Synergism must
exist to make the expansion efforts profitable and efficient.
Without this compatibility, efficiencies associated with
expansion are lost. The acquisitions described in this
chapter all exploit current strengths of these defense
companies.
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Loral is the number one military training and C31
company, deriving about 25 percent of its new contract awards
in this segment. The company claims its weapons simulators
and laser-based engagement systems are the focus of the
"virtual battlefields of tomorrow". [Ref. 25:p. 13] Its
recent acquisition of the advanced simulator business of Bolt
Beranek and Newman enhances Loral's position in this area.
Similarly, Lockheed's purchase of General Dynamics'
fighter plane division complements its F-117 and F-22 program.
The acquisition more than doubles the size of the Aeronautical
Systems Group and makes Lockheed a leader in worldwide
aircraft production. Lockheed is challenging McDonnell
Douglas as the nation's number one defense contractor [Ref.
23:p. 18].
Martin Marietta's acquisition of GE Aerospace merges
the two leading DoD research and development contractors into
a technological powerhouse. The merger will nearly double
Martin Marietta's annual revenues to more than $11 billion.
GE Aerospace receives 60 percent of its revenues from defense
electronics, and the merger creates the world's largest
defense electronics firm, surpassing GM-Hughes Electronics.
[Ref. 33:pp. 84-851
Finally, GM-Hughes Electronics' acquisition of General
Dynamics' missile business makes the company a more viable
industry leader in the missile systems field, which currently
accounts for 30 percent of the electronics segment's revenue
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[Ref. 22:p. 23]. Already producing Advanced Air-to-Air
Missiles (AMRAAMs) and TOW anti-tank missiles, GM-Hughes
Electronics' product line now also includes the Tomahawk sea-
launched cruise missile, the Advanced Cruise Missile, the
Sparrow, Standard, Stinger, and Rolling Airframe missiles, and
the Phalanx shipboard anti-missile gun. GM-Hughes Electronics
now rivals Raytheon as the nation's largest missile producer
[Ref. 33:p. 88].
4. Financial Strength
The final factor that determines if the expansion
strategy is to be pursued is the financial strength of the
company. This section of the thesis will examine three
measures of financial strength: current ratio, capital
structure ratio, and stock performance. These measure
liquidity, debt level, and investor confidence, respectively.
a. Current Ratio
The current ratio measures current assets as a
multiple of current liabilities. It is a measure of liquidity
which is primarily provided by cash generated from operating
activities. The multiple is the number of times current
assets will pay off current liabilities. Historically, a two
to one multiple has been considered ideal, although this
varies by industry. A multiple less than one indicates
potential financial problems and a multiple in excess of five
indicates too much cash on hand. [Ref. 34:p. 840]
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Expansion requires companies to have the cash to
finance acquisitions and capital spending. Thus, expanding
companies would be expected to have liquidity, as measured by
the current ratio multiple, greater than the industry average.
Table VII lists the liquidity of the top 15 defense
contractors for the last three years.
TABLE VII: LIQUIDITY OF MAJOR DEFENSE COMPANIES
Current Ratio
1993 1992 1991
1. Martin Marietta 2.95 1.71 1.41
2. Grumman 2.42 2.43 3.88
3. Loral 1.81 1.98 1.64
4. Raytheon 1.78 1.77 1.38
5. General Dynamics 1.65 1.88 1.39
6. Rockwell 1.62 1.66 1.45
7. Litton Industries 1.53 1.43 1.73
8. GM-Hughes 1.49 1.44 1.47
9. Northrop 1.29 1.25 1.51
10. Boeing 1.28 1.32 1.41
11. McDonnell Douglas 1.22 1.17 1.06
12. United Technologies 1.14 1.15 1.36
13. Lockheed 1.04 1.25 1.23
14. Westinghouse Electric 1.04 1.00 0.77
15. General Electric 0.91 0.94 1.00
Note: As of March 31, 1993
Source: The Value Line Investment Survey, July 1993.
The average current ratio on March 31, 1993 was
1.54, up slightly from the 1992 year-end figure of 1.49.
Martin Marietta, Loral, and Raytheon still possess the
liquidity to expand further into the defense electronics
sector with their above average cash balances. The liquidity
of GM-Hughes Electronics and Litton Industries is slightly
below average. Lockheed is the only company pursuing an
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expansion strategy with significantly below average liquidity.
Although Grumman has one of the strongest balace sheets in the
industry, like General Dynamics, it is downsizing and
liquidating many of its assets.
Many of the defense companies operate in a number
of different industries, which makes it difficult to develop
a meaningful set of industry averages for comparative
purposes. Removing those companies with less than 40 percent
of total revenues in defense increases the current ratio to
1.71. By this measure, only Grumman, Loral, Martin Marietta,
and Raytheon truly have the liquidity to expand. This
suggests that while highly liquid companies are more likely to
expand, lower levels of liquidity will not prevent expansion.
As will be discussed in the next section, the ability to incur
additional levels of debt can be a substitute for lower levels
of liquidity.
b. Capital Structure Ratio
Another measure of financial strength is the
company's capital structure. The capital structure ratio
measures long-term debt as a percentage of total
capitalization (long-term debt plus owner's equity).
Extensive dependence on debt makes the company vulnerable to
interest rates, lowers its investment rating to prospective
creditors, and leaves little room to incur additional debt to
finance expansion. Generally, when this ratio is greater than
50
25 percent, the current capital structure may be detrimental
to the company's future become success (Ref. 35:p. 59].
There are wide variations in the use of financial
leverage among industries and among individual firms within an
industry. The defense industry has seen revenues decline in
recent years, which has reduced equity positions. This made
it difficult to sell new stock and placed increasing emphasis
on debt financing. Forbes "Annual Report on American
Industry" reported that in 1992 the median capital structure
ratio for the entire aerospace and defense industry was 31.2
percent, the same as the all-industry median, and the average
was 37.2 percent (Ref. 36:p. 971. It is expected that those
companies pursuing an expansion strategy will have capital
structure ratios below the industry average, i-idicating the
potential to incur additional debt to finance further
expansion.
Table VIII indicates the capital structures of the
defense companies examined. The 1992 average capital
structure for the top 15 defense companies was 23.7 percent,
reflecting the financial strength of these companies. Of the
expanding defense companies, only Lockheed is significantly
higher than the industry average of 37.2 percent. Combined
with their high current ratios, Raytheon and GM-Hughes
Electronics are well positioned to finance additional
expansion.
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TABLE VIII: CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF MAJOR DEFENSE COMPANIES
Capital Structure Ratio
1992 1991 1990
1. Raytheon 01% 01% 02%
2. General Dynamics 02 16 41
3. QK-Hughes 10 02 03
4. Northrop 11 28 40
5. General Electric 13 17 16
6. Boeing 18 14 04
7. Martin Marietta 20 25 23
8. Rockwell 27 15 12
9. Loral 29 36 54
10. Grumman 31 42 46
11. Litton 36 38 42
12. Westinghouse 36 25 19
13. United Technologies 38 40 42
14. Lockheed 39 36 46
15. McDonnell Douglas 44 44 50
Source: The Value Line Investment Survey, July 1993.
c. Stock Performance
Wall Street's opinion of a company is a cumulative
measure of earnings, debt structure, product lines,
management, yield, and other performance measures. A
favorable reception by Wall Street encourages investment and
provides the needed external financing for expansion and
capital investment. Laggard performance in the stock market
means increasing the emphasis on debt financing.
Throughout the late 1980's, the stock performance
of aerospace/defense stocks lagged the market as a whole,
reflecting a bleak future. Today, however, the trend is
reversed [Ref. 32:p. 15]. Table IX indicates price
performance of defense industry stocks since January 1, 1993
[Ref. 37:p. 16]. The table shows the strong price performance
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of defense stocks relative to the Standard and Poor's (S&P)
500 Index and Industrial Index. It is expected that the
companies which choose the expansion strategy will have strong
price performance, reflecting strong cash flow, confidence in
management, and additional capital to finance expansion.
TABLE IX: DEFENSE SECTOR STOCK PERFORMANCE
# Stocks
VChange Industry Name in Group Group Index
* 28.8 Aerospace/Defense 7 183.94
+ 24.5 Aerospace/Defense Equipment 45 132.66
+ 18.4 Electronics-Military Systems 55 115.29
+ 5.3 S&P 500 Index 458.93
+ 1.8 S&P Industrial Index 516.72
Note: 1) * Change is since January 1, 1993
2) The group index measures what $100 invested on
January 1, 1984 is worth on October 1, 1993.
Source: Investor's Business Daily, I October 1993.
Table X provides detailed data on selected stock
data for the defense companies surveyed in this thesis. Based
upon the earnings per share (EPS) and relative price strength
(RS) rankings listed in the table, the six companies pursuing
the expansion strategy are showing earnings growth and
relative stock price strength greater than 50 percent of the
nation's publicly traded companies. In fact, only Grumman,
Litton Industries, Northrop, and Westinghouse Electric are
more than 10 percent off their 52- -4 highs. The strong
price performance in the industry reflects the underlying
success in the companies' strategy formulation.
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TABLE X: SELECTED STOCK DATA FOR TOP 15 DEFENSE COMPANIES
(as of 1 October 1993)
52-week
Company Symbol High Low Current EPS RS
Boeing BA 41 33 1/8 38 3/8 51 47
General Dynamics GD 94 48 1/4 92 1/8 74 82
General Electric GE 100 7/8 73 1/8 92 1/8 72 50
G(-Nughes Electronics GMH 38 17 7/8 37 7/8 72 84
Grumman GQ 41 7/8 19 5/8 37 1/2 77 72
Litton Industries LIT 69 3/8 39 1/2 59 3/8 64 62
Lockheed LK 68 1/2 43 5/8 63 1/2 74 52
Loral LOR 68 1/2 43 5/8 62 1/2 81 68
Martin Marietta MM 89 55 1/2 89 68 72
McDonnell Douglas MD 90 7/8 34 1/4 90 1/8 96 91
Northrop NOC 42 5/8 22 1/2 35 1/8 67 40
Raytheon RTN 64 3/4 40 3/4 62 1/8 64 60
Rockwell ROK 36 3/4 25 36 74 69
United Technologies UTX 59 3/8 41 1/2 55 1/2 14 60
Westinghouse Electric WX 17 1/8 9 3/8 13 12 17
Note: General Motors (GM) has three classes of common stock.
Class H common stock reflects the financial performance of GM-
Hughes Electronics Corporation (GMHE). Holders of stock in
GMHE (ticker symbol GMH) have no direct rights in the assets
of GMHE, but in the equity and assets of GM, which includes
100 percent of the stock of GMHE. GMHE is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of GM.
EPS: Earnings per share measures a company's earnings per
share growth in the last five years and the stability of that
growth. The percent change in the last two quarters' earnings
versus same quarter a year earlier is combined and averaged
with the five year record. Result is compared to all
companies in the tables and ranked on a scale from I to 99,
with 99 being the highest. A 90 rank means the company
produced earnings in the top ten percent. Companies with
superior earnings records rank 80 or higher.
RS: Relative price strength measures daily each stock's
relative price strength over the last 12 months compared to
all other stocks. Results are ranked from 1 to 99, with 99
beinS the highest. Those stocks below 70 indicate weaker or
more laggard price performance.
Source: Investor's Business Daily, 1 October 1993.
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5. Su•ary of Expansion Factors
Table XI provides a summary of the major factors
influencing the strategies of defense companies. The growth
potential of a company's core business appears to be a better
predictor than exposure to defense spending. Although the
recent bull market and the success of alternative strategies
has boosted stock prices, liquidity and capital structure have
also proven to be influential factors. The companies in the
defense electronics sector with financial strength are most
likely to pursue a strategy of acquiring or expanding into
markets that complement their existing technology.
Raytheon, GM-Hughes Electronics, and Loral are all
poised for further developments that expand their market share
in defense and capitalize on core competencies in defense
electronics. Rockwell is also positioned to pursue an
expansion strategy. Companies such as Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas, United Technologies, and General Electric are
beginning to suffer the effects of a world-wide recession and
reduced air travel. Revenues have flattened or declined,
threatening their currently strong financial strength. With
little growth in their core defense businesses, these
companies will pursue alternative strategies.
Lockheed saw an opportunity to take the lead in
tactical aircraft consolidation, despite having below average
financial strength and low growth prospects for its principal
business. The fighter/attack aircraft business consisted of
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four manufacturers- -Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and
General Dynamics. Grumman and McDonnell Douglas are facing
reduced production due to mature programs like the F-16, F-14,
F-15, and F-18. The only figher aircraft in the pipeline is
the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter, to be produced by a team
of Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Boeing. Lockheed's
purchase of General Dynamics' Fort Worth Division not only
reduced the cost of the F-22 program by cutting the overhead
bill, but it also gained market share for Lockheed at the
expense of fading competitors like Grumman and McDonnell
Douglas.
As the process of Darwinian natural selection
continues, the fittest companies described in this chapter
will flourish and continue to grow. However, as the current
defense spending environment continues to shrink, fewer
opportunities exist for expansion in the defense sector. The
next chapter will examine an alternative expansion strategy--
diversification into commercial markets.
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TABLE XI: SUMMARY OF EXPANSION STRATEGY FACTORS
Exposure to Market Segment
Defense Growing Financial
Company Spending >40% (Core Business) Strength
Boeing NO NO(commercial air) A++
GD YES NO (nuclear subs) B+
GE NO NO (aircraft eng) A++
GM-Hughes YES YES (electronics) A
Grumman YES NO (tactical air) B+
Litton YES YES (electronics) B++
Lockheed YES NO (tactical air) C++
Loral YES YES (electronics) B++
Martin Marietta YES YES (electronics) A
McD Douglas YES NO(commercial air) C++
Northrop YES NO (strategic air) B+
Raytheon YES YES (electronics) A
Rockwell YES YES (electronics) A+
United Tech YES NO (engines) A
Westinghouse NO YES (electronics) B++
Note: Financial strength is the rating provided by The
Value Line Investment Survey as of July 31, 1993
with A++ the highest rating available. The rating is
considered complementary to the factors analyzed in
this chapter.
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IV. DIVERSIFICATION INTO COMOERCIAL MARKETS
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY
Declining defense revenues and negative growth in core
defense businesses have forced many defense companies to
convert their production lines and diversify into commercial
markets. This chapter of the thesis will outline the basic
elements of the diversification strategy, its advantages and
the barriers to implementation. Succeeding sections will
focus on the defense companies that are pursuing the
diversification strategy and the factors that guided
management's decision to pursue such a strategy. Although
many companies are relying more on commercial revenues, this
chapter will analyze only those companies aggressively
pursuing such a strategy.
The diversification strategy is much more than simply
improving the existing commercial business. It is a variation
of the 'Invest & Grow' approach outlined in Figure 11 [Ref.
7:p. 8]. Diversification involves the conversion of existing
product lines into civilian-oriented pursuits, opening new
lines of civilian-oriented products, or buying commercial
businesses. Current defense backlogs will support companies
through this transition period as they diversify and expand
into commercial markets.
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Figure 11: The General Dynamics Strategic Matrix
The United States Government has been particularly active
in promoting this strategy. Created in 1992, the Defense
Conversion Commission (DCC) favors actions which promote the
integration of military and commercial technology, products,
and processes- -including removing barriers to integration and
increasing reliance on the private sector for defense goods
and services [Ref. l:p. iv] . The DCC's publication, Aii~sting
to the Drawdown, was published in December 1992 and addresses
these issues.
The "800 Panel" was established by the fiscal 1991 defense
authorization bill. The panel is headed by Senator Jeff
Bingaman (D-NM), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, and includes
acquisition experts and representatives from the defense
industry. The panel's 1800-page report on how the Pentagon
can simplify defense contracting and make it easier for
companies to diversify was submitted to Congress in January
1993. [Ref. 38:p. 42]
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An 18-month study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies reported that "without links between the
commercial and defense sector, the pace of innovation in each
is slowed--and both the nation's security and economic
competitiveness suffer." [Ref. 39:p. xi] Currently, the
national pool of scientists and engineers is split, with
nearly one-third employed only in military work [Ref. 39:p.
xi] Diversification will foster the free-flow of state-of-the
art technology between both sectors and will provide the DoD
with a larger industrial base upon which it can draw in times
of crisis. Government-led efforts such as the DCC and the
"800 Panel" are intended to facilitate this transition for
defense related companies.
These efforts are necessary because of the increased
segregation of the defense sector. This segregation is
largely the result of barriers which diminish the ability of
defense companies to compete with commercial companies. These
barriers result in price increases for defense companies and
include the following:
- Government unique accounting practices
- DoD-unique standards and specifications
- Government's ownership of rights in technical data
- Government-unique contract and information collecting
requirements
- Government audit and oversight roles [Ref. l:p. 19]
Table XII outlines many of the major differences between
the two sectors [Ref. 10:p. 61). Defense companies are
organized to operate within an environment in which the
government, not the market, determines what is produced. The
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presence of increased competition for a civilian-oriented firm
is clearly seen in the table. Managerial discretion widens
and additional risk is borne by the company. Diversification
requires increased emphasis on market factors such as cost
control, quality, and customer service. Even if the barriers
can be overcome, diversification presents obstacles.
TABLE XII: KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND DEFENSE FIRMS
Characteristic Civilian-related Firm Defense-related Firm
Products Low technology High technology
Market
Demand Competitive Monopsonistic
Supply Competitive Oligopolistic
Prices Constrained by Determined or
market competition influenced by
government
Outputs Constrained by Determined by
market competition government
Financing Security markets Federal government
Burden of risk Borne by firm Divided between firm
and government
Managerial Relatively wide Severely constrained
Discretion
Profits Constrained by Regulated via
market competition contract
Source: Murray Weidenbaum, Small Wars. Big Defense: Paying
for the Military After the Cold War, p. 144.
The McKinsey study, conducted for General Dynamics in
1986, found an economic failure rate of 80 percent for
acquisitions by defense companies of non-defense businesses.
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This failure rate is slightly lower for diversification
efforts by non-defense companies. The study blames the
barriers identified in Table XII for the high failure rate.
[Ref. 7:pp. 13-14]
Although history and current research point to many of the
problems associated with diversification into new markets,
many of the top 15 defense contractors are pursuing such a
strategy. The next section of the thesis will highlight the
most significant events associated with the industry's
diversification efforts. The final section will examine the
factors that shaped the diversification strategy.
B. DEFENSE COMPANIES IN PURSUIT OF DIVERSIFICATION
Table XIII reflects the growing trend towards
diversification. The table provides a summary of new DoD
contract awards displayed as a percentage of total sales.
Martin Marietta, Raytheon, Rockwell, and Westinghouse Electric
have all seen their defense exposure shrink and are
aggressively pursuing commercial diversification. Martin
Marietta has seen the most drastic results, with defense
contract awards falling 27.4 percent between 1990 and 1992.
McDonnell Douglas also saw defense contracts fall
significantly in 1991 and 1992. This is primarily the result
of the A-12 cancellation, structural and contractual problems
with the C-17, and decreased production of the F-15 [Ref.
40:pp. 25-26]. McDonnell Douglas is focusing on globalizing
and downsizing its operations.
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TABLE XIII: NEW DEFENSE CONTRACT AWARDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL REVENUES ($million) (1)
1992 1991 1990 Trend
2,748 1,397 2,424
Boeing 9.1 4.8 8.8 + 0.3
30,184 29,314 27,595
3,450 7,917 6,569
General Dynamics 99.4 90.5 64.6 +34.8
3,472 8,751 10,173
4,174 5,144 5,823
General Electric 11.0 11.9 13.5 - 2.5
37,943 43,089 43,017
4,558 4,495 4,306
GM-Hughes (2) 37.5 39.2 37.0 + 0.5
12,169 11,481 11,626
2,188 2,345 2,725
Grumman 62.7 59.2 68.3 - 5.6
3,492 3,964 3,990
2,318 1,545 1,562
Litton 40.7 29.6 30.3 +10.4
5,693 5,219 5,156
4,655 2,345 3,855
Lockheed 46.1 23.9 38.7 + 7.4
10,100 9,809 9,958
1,662 1,202 557
Loral 49.8 41.7 26.2 +23.6
3,335 2,882 2,127
2,496 2,781 4,246
Martin Marietta 41.9 45.8 69.3 -27.4
5,954 6,075 6,126
McDonnell 5,590 8,053 8,923
Douglas 32.2 43.7 54.9 -22.7
17,384 18,448 16,255
4,850 3,322 748
Northrop 87.4 58.3 13.6 +73.8
5,550 5,694 5,490
(continued on next page)
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TABLE XIII: NEW CONTRACT AWARDS FOR DEFENSE COMPANIES
(continued)
1992 1991 1990 Trend
2,843 4,132 4,167
Raytheon 31.4 44.6 45.0 -13.6
9,058 9,274 9,268
1,267 1,742 2,230
Rockwell 11.6 14.6 18.0 - 6.4
10,910 11,927 12,379
United 3,087 2,938 2,951
Technologies 14.3 14.1 13.8 + 0.5
21,641 20,840 21,442
Westinghouse 1,238 1,887 2,274
Electric 14.7 14.7 17.6 - 2.9
8,447 12,794 12,915
Key:
Fiscal Year
Contract Awards
Percent
Total Revenue
Note: (1) Defense contract awards are based on prime
contracts of $25,000 or more for the DoD
(2) Defense contract awards include those for General
Motors and GM-Hughes Electronics; separate data
unavailable
Source: Government Executive, August 1991-93; The Value
Line Investment Survey, July 1993.
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GM-Hughes Electronics, Lockheed, Loral, and Northrop are
all pursuing more modest diversification strategies, secondary
to their expansion strategies. All four companies have seen
their exposure to defense spending increase despite these
diversification attempts. Northrop's surge in defense
exposure is primarily the result of its B-2 stealth bomber
sales, which now account for nearly 60 percent of total
revenues [Ref. 41:p. 29]. 1991 military contracts surged as
the company obtained a long-run initial production (LRIP)
contract for the B-2, as well as follow-up contracts for the
next generation F/A-18 [Ref. 41:p. 34]. Also, Northrop's
acquisition of LTV's aerospace and defense business
contributed to 1992's higher contract level. With B-2
production scheduled to end in 1997 and revenues expected to
decline dramatically, Northrop is beginning to realize the
importance of diversification. Table XIV provides a summary
of those companies pursuing the diversification strategy.
TABLE XIV: DEFENSE COMPANIES PURSUING THE DIVERSIFICATION
STRATEGY
Diversification Strategy
Primary Secondary
Martin Marietta GM-Hughes Electronics
Raytheon Lockheed
Rockwell Loral
Westinghouse Electric Northrop
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1. Martin Marietta
In addition to expanding its defense business, Martin
Marietta's "Peace Dividend Strategy" calls for "broadening and
increasing participation in civil government and commercial
markets that are closely related to our current strengths".
[Ref. 27:p. 3] In 1992 alone, Martin Marietta's civil
government sales increased by more than 20 percent. Sales for
that year include new contracts with the Department of Energy,
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Treasury
Department. In 1992 Martin Marietta completed deliveries of
267 automated flats-sorting machines, capable of processing
10,000 magazines and large envelopes an hour, to the U.S.
Postal Service. Martin Marietta foresees future growth in
upgrading existing sorters, developing next generation bar
code sorters, and developing image recognition technology in
sorting mail. [Ref. 27:pp. 15-16]
Martin Marietta's Materials Group acquired quarries in
Virginia and Iowa in order to fortify its position as one of
the world's leading producers of crushed rock. Shipments of
crushed stone, gravel and sand increased 12 percent to 56
million tons in 1991. The company is betting that an
improving economy, accelerating highway construction in the
Southeast and Midwest, and additional government
infrastructure initiatives will result in further growth in
this area. [Ref. 27:p. 22]
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The Astronautics Group of Martin Marietta is actively
seeking private sector applications of its DoD electronic and
electromechanical technology. The company is spending
increasing amounts of RDT&E on applications such as the use of
advanced photovoltai rs. Originally developed to provide solar
power for orbiting spacecraft, this technology is now being
used in generating clean electrical power on Earth and in
image-processing technology to screen and analyze medical
images such as mammograms. The company's Zetatron ion
accelerator, derived from defense related technology, is
becoming an important tool in fields ranging from medicine to
environmental monitoring. [Ref. 27:p. 103
2. Raytheon
Raytheon Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Dennis
J. Picard wants his company to receive half of its profits
from commercial enterprises, up from nearly 30 percent in 1992
[Ref. 42:p.1]. Raytheon's current commercial products have
been highly successful. The appliance group is introducing a
wide range of new products, including energy efficient
refrigerators from Amana and newly designed washers and dryers
from Speed Queen. Raytheon Marine Company is enjoying solid
growth with its autopilots, instruments, and electronic chart
plotters and is increasing its market penetration in these
areas. The company is also a major player in the Federal
Aviation Administration's upgrading of the nation's air
traffic control systems.
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In June of 1993 Raytheon purchased the Corporate Jets
business from British Aerospace PLC for $390 million in cash.
Corporate Jets makes 125-800 and 125-1000 jets which seat up
to 12 passengers. The acquisition will complement Raytheon's
Beech Aircraft business which makes turboprops and light jets
and is expected to boost annual sales in the aircraft market
to greater than $1.7 billion. The acquisition is seen as a
major move to rebound in the commercial airline business.
[Ref. 43:p. 19]
3. Rockwell
Cancellation of the small ICBM program and mature
defense programs like the B-1 bomber and MX missile have
forced Rockwell to diversify its business. Rockwell is
expanding into the wireless communications market, with an
integrated circuit family designed for digital cellular
telephones, and commercial avionics. In the first quarter of
1993, Rockwell purchased Sundstrand Corporation's Data Control
Division, which will become part of Rockwell's Commercial
Avionics business, for $225 million. The company makes flight
data and cockpit voice recorders, ground proximity and wind
shear warning computers, flight management systems, and other
avionics products. [Ref. 44]
4. Westinghouse Electric
President Clinton used a Baltimore Westinghouse plant
as the backdrop for his multi-billion-dollar defense
conversion program announcement in early 1993. He touted
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Westinghouse as a "stunning example of just how brilliantly
[conversion] can be done...." [Ref. 33:p. 82] Westinghouse
wants its military-laden electronics division to receive 50
percent of its total revenues from non-defense markets by the
mid-1990s, up from 27 percent in 1992 [Ref. 45:pp. 5-7].
Westinghouse is pursuing opportunities in law enforcement,
security systems, transportation management, information
systems, and electric vehicles. The company is also a market
leader in postal automation systems and environmental
services, including the only incinerator in the United States
permitted to burn low-level radioactive waste.
5. GM-Hughes Electronics
GM-Hughes Electronics has recently formed a special
business segment which concentrates solely on new and emerging
markets in commercial technology. Representing 18 percent of
1992 revenues, the telecommunications and space segment
already produces 40 percent of the satellites currently in
service for commercial communication (Ref. 22:p. 5]. GM-
Hughes Electronics' largest effort is in the new direct-to-
home television broadcasting service called DirecTvTm.
DirecTvTm has already signed The Disney Channel and Paramount
Picture's video division for its scheduled introduction in
1994. An alternative to cable television, DirecTvTM will
offer satellite service with over 150 channels beamed to a
small 18 inch antenna at the customer's home. [Ref. 22:p. 18]
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GM-Hughes Electronics is also anticipating continued
growth in its automotive electronics segment as emission and
fuel economy standards tighten, as well as increased demands
for safety features. Independent sources estimate that the
average electrical content of automobiles could rise from $760
in 1992 to $1,800 per vehicle by the end of the decade [Ref.
22:p. 6]. In 1992, GM-Hughes became the first manufacturer to
successfully introduce a single computer that combines
emission, fuel, and rear-wheel anti-lock brake control [Ref.
22:p. 9].
6. Lockheed
Lockheed's heavy-lift launch capability provides
tremendous opportunities in the future. According to the 1992
Annual Report, Lockheed has been responsible for 42 of the 52
space shuttle missions from liftoff to landing [Ref. 23:p.
23]. Lockheed is contracted to provide satellites for
Motorola's IRIDIUMTM space-based communication system and
recently formed a joint venture with Khrunichev Enterprises,
a Russian Aerospace firm, to participate further in the
commercial satellite business.
Lockheed is also pursuing new contracts in bar coding
services for the U.S. Postal Service, automated toll road
collection procedures, and child support and parking ticket
collection services [Ref. 23:p. 5]. The company's joint
venture with AT&T addresses the problems of highway
congestion. Their plans call for an intelligent vehicle
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highway system which would make use of radio, video, and
computers to form an intelligent network, providing such
things as automatic toll collection and traffic management.
A "smart card" with a microscopic computer attached to the car
will replace rolls of quarters and toll booths. The value of
this market is estimated at $200 billion over the next 20
years. (Ref. 23:p. 24]
7. Loral
Loral expects that by 1995, over 35 percent of total
revenue will come from non-defense sources, up from 20 percent
in 1992. Loral is expanding its market share in such products
as data recorders, telecommunication switches, network
management systems, computer-based training and simulation
systems, large-scale archiving, information processing
services, and commercial satellites. Additionally, the
formation of Loral/Globalstar, a joint venture between Loral
and Space Systems/Loral, a partially owned subsidiary acquired
from Ford Motor Company, positions the company for further
expansion in the commercial satellite market. [Ref. 25:pp.
5,7]
8. Northrop
In an effort to further enhance its position in the
aircraft subassembly business, Northrop established a separate
commercial aircraft division in 1992. Facing declining DoD
revenues and having mature defense programs, Northrop wants to
become a subassembly giant, supplying "the biggest parts of
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the biggest planes". (Ref. 32:p. 67] In 1992, Northrop and
the Carlyle Group purchased a minority interest in LTV's
Vought Aircraft business. Vought is an $800 million business
that supplies components such as the tail section pieces to
Boeing jets. The Vought acquisition complements Northrop's
already strong subcomponent products which include fuselage,
cargo and passenger doors; floorbeams; and other structural
components for versions of the 747. For over 25 years
Northrop has been Boeing's largest subcontractor, drawing
about ten percent of 1992 total sales from the 747 production
program [Ref. 41:p. 15].
Despite the past failures and risks associated with
commercial diversification, this section showed that many
defense companies are making major impacts on commercial
markets. Although not intended to be all inclusive, Table XV
provides a summary of the major defense industry
diversification highlights. The next section of the chapter
will examine the factors that have framed the evolution of the
diversification strategy.
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TABLE XV: DEFENSE INDUSTRY DIVERSIFICATION HIGHLIGHTS
General Motors-Hughes Electronics
1993: -Signs first two programming contracts for its
new DirecTv service
-Automotive electronics reorganized into Delco
Electronics to better enhance competitive position
1992: -Joint venture with Lockheed and Morrison-Knudsen
Corp to develop high-tech mass transit cars
-$749.4 million second quarter restructuring write-
off (7 groups consolidated into 3, including a
new commercial opportunities segment
Lockheed
1992: - Announces plans to co-market an "intelligent
vehicle highway system" with AT&T
Loral
1992: -Loral/Globalstar joint venture to explore mobile
cellular telephone market
Martin Marietta
1992: -Crushed Stone unit of the Materials Group acquires
two stone quarries; opens up two new quarries
1991: -$38.5 million contract with U.S. Postal Service to
improve and automate mail processing
Northrop
1992: -Selected by the Los Angeles Rapid Transit District
to lead a group in the design and development of a
lightweight bus using composites used in military
aircraft
-Establishes a Commercial Aircraft Division
-Purchases a minority interest in LTV's Vought
Aircraft Company
(continued on next page)
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TABLE XV: DEFENSE INDUSTRY DIVERSIFICATION HIGHLIGHTS
(continued)
Raytheon
1993: -Acquires the Corporate Jets business of British
Aerospace PLC
-Announces joint venture to manufacture and
assemble the X2000 high speed tilt train for use
by Amtrak
1992: -Loses bid for Cessna Aircraft to Textron
Rockwell
1993: -Purchases Sundstrand Corporation's Data Control
Division
-Acquires Sprecher and Schuh AG of Switzerland
-Teams with Sumitomo Corporation of America to
build rail cars for Los Angeles' Metro Green Line
passenger rail system
Westinghouse Electric
1992: -Acquired Florida First Processing, Inc.
Source: Wall Street Journal Index; 1992 Annual Reports
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C. FACTORS SHAPING STRATEGY SELECTION
The purpose of this section is to analyze the factors that
have shaped the diversification strategy within the defense
sector. The factors are illustrated in the flowchart in
Figure 12. First, a company must consider whether or not it
wishes to decrease its exposure to defense spending. Second,
current technology and production facilities must not only be
compatible with commercial applications, but diversification
must be into a growing market. Third, companies must consider
their ability to fund this expansion or conversion. The
interaction of all three factors is the final determinant in
strategy selection.
Factor 1
Do I want to decrease NO Seek alternative
my exposure to defense strategy
spending?
YES
Factor 2
Is my technology compatible NO Seek alternative
with and in a growing strategy/make capital
commercial sector? investments
SYES
Factor 3 1
Do I have the financial NO Improve profitability
strength to fund of current business
diversification
YES
SDIVESIFY I
Figure 12: Factors Framing the Diversification Strategy
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It is expected that those defense companies which face
declining defense revenues will consider pursuing a
diversification strategy. However, the current defense
spending environment has resulted in few market niches that
are not s hrinking. Given the context of the current
environment, all of the defense companies analyzed in this
thesis can benefit from commercial diversification, assuming
the factors in this section agree. The issue is the degree of
diversification to be pursued. Therefore, the defense sector
within which the company participates was not considered a
factor in selection of the diversification strategy.
1. Exposure to Defense Spending
A 1991 study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) found that nearly one-half (44
percent) of U.S. defense companies planned on increasing their
percentage of civilian over military sales in the next five
years. This number falls to 32 percent when excluding those
companies in which DoD sales are less than 50 percent of total
sales. [Ref. 46:p. 51 The study suggests that the
specialized nature of doing business with the Pentagon, as
outlined in Table XII, inhibits diversification. It is also
possible that companies which are highly exposed to defense
spending, unless in a "niche" sector, are more likely to hedge
against further defense spending reductions through
diversification. It is therefore difficult to predict whether
or not a more exposed company is more likely to diversify.
76
Table XVI lists the top DoD contractors based on 1991
defense and space revenues as a percentage of total revenues
[Ref. 10:p. 60]. It should be noted that all four of the
extremely exposed companies pursuing diversification are
pursuing expansion as their primary strategy. Westinghouse
Electric is the only diversifying company not extremely or
highly exposed. This table suggests that while companies with
higher exposure to defense spending may be slightly more
inclined to diversify, there are additional factors to
consider. Therefore, exposure to defense spending does not
appear to be a strong predictor of diversification.
TABLE XVI: EXPOSURE TO DEFENSE SPENDING
Company Percent Category
Grumman 90.8 Extremely Exposed
Northrop 89.6
Martin Marietta 85.6
Lockheed 85.0
General Dynamics 84.6
Loral 75.3
McDonnell Douglas 55.1 Highly Exposed
Raytheon 53.9
GM-Hughes Electronics 49.6
Litton Industries 46.9
Rockwell 43.6
United Technologies 25.9 Moderately Exposed
Westinghouse Electric 25.4
Boeing 19.9
General Electric 12.3 Minimally Exposed
Nute: Percent = 1991 defense and space revenues as a
percentage of total revenues
Source: DRI/McGraw-Hill
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2. Core Comercial Technologies
Perhaps a more critical factor in predicting corporate
diversification is the commercial market within which the
company currently. participates. Areas of the commercial
market to be captured must exploit the strengths of the
defense companies--namely large-scale high-tech systems
integration. Companies which have technology that is
compatible with a growing commercial market are more likely to
aggressively diversify.
A DRI study identified six potential areas of
diversification for defense companies: commercial aircraft
manufacturing, air traffic control systems, non-defense space
systems, environmental systems, intelligent vehicle-highway
systems, and high-speed ground transportation [Ref. 32:p.
129]. Other analysts have included digital cellular
communication systems, digital signal compression, character
recognition, direct broadcast satellites, airport integration
systems, high-speed rail transit systems, and magnetic
levitation trains. As noted in section B of this chapter,
many of the diversifying companies are already pursuing
activities in these markets.
Table XVII provides a list of the major non-defense
products and services offered by these companies. The
products and services noted in bold are the high-growth
commercial markets described in the preceding paragraph. As
illustrated in the table, those companies with a substantial
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presence in these growth segments have shown a higher tendency
to diversify. Boeing is the only company with a strong
presence in these markets that is not diversifying,
principally because of its already strong position in these
markets. General Dynamics, General Electric, McDonnell
Douglas, and United Technologies have minimal footprints in
these growing sectors and are pursuing alternative strategies.
All four of the companies identified in Table XIV as pursuing
diversification as their primary strategy have a strong
presence in these markets.
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TABLE XVII: PRINCIPAL NON-DEFENSE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
Boeing aircraft,advanced computing &
telecommunications
General space systems (pending sale to Martin
Dynamics Marietta)
General aircraft engines,appliances,broadcasting,
Electric electrical products,energy systems,finance
GM-Hughes satellite-based communications,air traffic
Electronics control systems,auto components
Grumman commercial aircraft components,electronic
data processing,special purpose vehicles
Litton integrated manufacturing and industrial
automation systems,resource exploration
Lockheed space systems, traffic systems,computer
equipment
Loral advanced electronics,space communication
systems
Martin space systems, information systems,air
Marietta traffic control,energy systems,construction
McDonnell aircraft,launching vehicles,finance,
Douglas equipment leasing
Northrop transit systems,commercial aircraft
components and avionics
Raytheon telecommunications equipment,air traffic
control,energy and environmental services
Rockwell industrial automation systems,space systems,
automotive components,graphics
United aircraft engines,air conditioning and
Technologies heating,automotive components
Westinghouse power plants,satellite-based communications,
Electric environmental services,broadcasting
Source: 1992 Annual Reports
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3. Financial Strength
The final factor that determines if the expansion
strategy is to be pursued is the financial strength of the
company. This section of the thesis will examine three
measures of financial strength: current ratio, capital
structure ratio, and stock performance. These measures are
described in detail in section C of Chapter III.
a. Current Ratio
The current ratio is a measure of liquidity
provided by cash generated from operating activities.
Diversification requires companies to have cash to finance
acquisitions of commercial businesses, convert production
lines and increase capital spending by investing in new
production lines and equipment. Diversifying companies would
be expected to have greater liquidity, as measured by the
current ratio multiple, than the industry average. Table
XVIII lists the liquidity of the top 15 defense contractors
for the last three years.
The average current ratio on March 31, 1993
was 1.54, up slightly from the 1992 year-end figure of 1.49.
Martin Marietta, Loral, Raytheon, and Rockwell all possess the
liquidity for further investments in commercial production.
The remaining four diversifying companies have below-average
cash levels. This data suggests that lower levels of
liquidity will not prevent diversification. As will be
discussed in the next section, the ability to incur additional
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levels of debt can be a substitute for lower levels of
liquidity.
TABLE XVIII: LIQUIDITY OF MAJOR DEFENSE COMPANIES
Current Ratio
1993 1992 1991
1. Martin Marietta 2.95 1.71 1.41
2. Grumman 2.42 2.43 3.88
3. Loral 1.81 1.98 1.64
4. Raytheon 1.78 1.77 1.38
5. General Dynamics 1.65 1.88 1.39
6. Rockwell 1.62 1.66 1.45
7. Litton Industries 1.53 1.43 1.73
8. GM-Hughes Electronics 1.49 1.44 1.47
9. Northrop 1.29 1.25 1.51
10. Boeing 1.28 1.32 1.41
11. McDonnell Douglas 1.22 1.17 1.06
12. United Technologies 1.14 1.15 1.36
13. Lockheed 1.04 1.25 1.23
14. Westinghouse Electric 1.04 1.00 0.77
15. General Electric 0.91 0.94 1.00
Note: As of March 31, 1993
Source: The Value Line Investment Survey, July 1993.
b. Capital Structure Ratio
The capital structure ratio measures long-term
debt as a percentage of total capitalization (long-term debt
plus owners' equity). It is expected that those companies
pursuing a diversification strategy will have capital
structure ratios below the industry average, indicating the
potential to incur additional debt to finance further
commercial expansion. Forbes reported that in 1992 the
average capital structure for the entire aerospace and defense
industry was 37.2 percent [Ref. 36:p. 97].
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Table XIX displays the capital structures of
the defense companies examined in this thesis. Of the
diversifying defense companies, only Lockheed is above the
industry average of 37.2 percent. The table indicates that
United Technologies and McDonnell Douglas also have higher
than average capital structure ratios, suggesting that the
remaining 12 companies are outperforming the industry and do
have the capacity to expand commercially.
TABLE XIX: CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF MAJOR DEFENSE COMPANIES
Capital Structure Ratio
1992 1991 1990
1. Raytheon 01% 01% 02%
2. General Dynamics 02 16 41
3. GM-Hughes Electronics 10 02 03
4. Northrop 11 28 40
5. General Electric 13 17 16
6. Boeing 18 14 04
7. Martin Marietta 20 25 23
8. Rockwell 27 15 12
9. Loral 29 36 54
10. Grumman 31 42 46
11. Litton Industries 36 38 42
12. Westinghouse Electric 36 25 19
13. United Technologies 38 40 42
14. Lockheed 39 36 46
15. McDonnell Douglas 44 44 50
Source: The Value Line Investment Survey, July 1993.
c. Stock Performance
A favorable reception by Wall Street
encourages investment and provides the needed external
financing for expansion and capital investment into commercial
markets. Table XX provides selected stock data for the
defense companies surveyed in this thesis. Based upon the
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earnings per share (EPS) and relative price strength (RS)
rankings listed in the table, six of the eight diversifying
companies have outperformed 50 percent of the nation's
publicly traded companies.
Of the diversifying companies, only Northrop
and Westinghouse Electric have shown laggard performance.
Declining sales and an overdependence on the volatile B-2
program have restrained Northrop's stock performance.
Westinghouse's stock performance has been battered by poor
performance by its Financial Services and Broadcasting
businesses. Both units are being liquidated which should
improve Westinghouse's financial outlook in the future.
4. Summary of Diversification Factors
Highly exposed companies like Lockheed, Loral,
Martin Marietta, and Northrop have realized the importance of
diversification. In addition to expanding in the defense
sector, these companies continue to seek commercial markets as
a hedge against additional cuts in defense spending.
Westinghouse Electronics is also pursuing diversification
despite being more modestly exposed to defense spending. The
current exposure to defense spending was therefore not a
strong predictor of diversification.
Many defense companies view the current defense
spending drawdown as permanent and believe diversification is
a necessary survival strategy. These companies believe that
their future profitability is dependent upon their ability to
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TABLE XX: SELECTED STOCK DATA FOR TOP 15 DEFENSE COMPANIES
(as of 1 October 1993)
52-week
Company Symbol High Low Current EPS RS
Boeing BA 41 33 1/8 38 3/8 51 47
General Dynamics GD 94 48 1/4 92 1/8 74 82
General Electric GE 100 7/8 73 1/8 92 1/8 72 50
GM-Hughes Electronics GMH 38 17 7/8 37 7/8 72 84
Grumman GQ 41 7/8 19 5/8 37 1/2 77 72
Litton Industries LIT 69 3/8 39 1/2 59 3/8 64 62
Lockheed LK 68 1/2 43 5/8 63 1/2 74 52
Loral LOR 68 1/2 43 5/8 62 1/2 81 68
Martin Marietta MM 89 55 1/2 89 68 72
McDonnell Douglas MD 90 7/8 34 1/4 90 I/d 96 91
Northrop NOC 42 5/8 22 1/2 35 1/8 67 40
Raytheon RTN 64 3/4 40 3/4 62 1/8 64 60
Rockwell ROK 36 3/4 25 36 74 69
United Technologies UTX 59 3/8 41 1/2 55 1/2 14 60
Westinghouse Electric WX 17 1/8 9 3/8 13 12 17
Note: General Motors (GM) has three classes of common stock.
Class H common stock reflects the financial performance of GM-
Hughes Electronics Corporation (GMHE). Holders of stock in
GMHE (ticker symbol GMH) have no direct rights in the assets
of GMHE, but in the equity and assets of GM, which includes
100 percent of the stock of GMHE. GMHE is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of GM.
EPS: Earnings per share measures a company's earnings per
share growth in the last five years and the stability of that
growth. The percent change in the last two quarters' earnings
versus same quarter a year earlier is combined and averaged
with the five year record. Result is compared to all
companies in the tables and ranked on a scale from 1 to 99,
with 99 being the highest. A 90 rank means the company
produced earnings in the top ten percent. Companies with
superior earnings records rank 80 or higher.
RS: Relative price strength measures daily each stock's
relative price strength over the last 12 months compared to
all other stocks. Results are ranked from 1 to 99, with 99
being the highest. Those stocks below 70 indicate weaker or
more laggard price performance.
Source: Investor's Business Daily, 1 October 1993.
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keep production lines open using commercial production and
have sought diversification independent of their current
financial strength. These companies are diversifying in hopes
of creating a stronger financial position for themselves in
the future. Financial strength was therefore not a very good
predictor of diversification.
A better predictor of diversification was the
ability of the company to compete in a growing "niche"
commercial market. This required compatible technology and
core competencies that enabled the company to expand into
these new markets. Those companies in rapidly expanding
fields such as advanced telecommunications and environmental
services were more likely to diversify. It was this factor
which explained the diMversification of companies such as
Lockheed, Northrop, and Westinghouse Electric, all of whom
have weak balance sheets and laggard stock performance.
The negative view of failed diversification
attempts in the 1970s continues to linger and several
companies are pursuing more modest attempts at diversification
or avoiding it altogether. As the current defense spending
environment continues, it is likely that more defense
companies will choose to diversify. Current defense backlogs
will continue to support diversification. The following
chapter offers an alternative to diversifying- -globalization.
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V. GLOBALIZATION--REPLACING DoD REVENUES WITH EXPORTS
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE GLOBALIZATION STRATEGY
As the current defense spending environment continues to
tighten, many companies will look increasingly towards foreign
sales. This chapter will address the globalization strategy,
its strengths, and barriers to implementation. Succeeding
sections will focus on the companies that are pursuing the
strategy and the factors that have guided management's
decision to pursue such a strategy. The thesis does not
address the myriad of issues outside of the company's control,
such as foreign investment in U.S. companies and offshore
sourcing.
As represented by Figure 13, the globalization strategy is
an attempt to maintain current market position in the defense
sector by replacing declining DoD sales with sales to foreign
governments [Ref. 7:p. 8]. The matrix suggests that only the
strongest defense companies should be maintaining their
defense investments. However, this chapter will illustrate
that several defense companies have viewed globalization as a
fundamental strategy to survive in today's market.
Globalization is seen as an alternative to diversification.
Companies with a desire to remain in the defense sector
continue to emphasize the importance of foreign sales.
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Figure 13: The General Dynamics Strategic Matrix
Accounting for 86 percent of all weapons sold
internationally in recent years, the U.S., Great Britain,
France, Russia, and China constitute the largest arms
exporters. Although the absolute dollar amount of American
arms exports fell from $14 billion to $13.6 billion from 1991
to 1992, the U.S. continues to control over 50 percent of the
world market. Experts predict that by the end of the decade
foreign sales will rise from 15 percent to roughly 25 percent
of American arms production. [Ref. 47:p. 100]
Industry executives have long promoted this strategy
despite concern from Congress. They have argued that
hindering globalization puts U.S. weapons makers at a
competitive disadvantage and costs the U.S. jobs. As an
unidentified senior industry executive emphasized:
If Congress or some other group opposes a sale, we just
remind them how much more expensive the weapons become and
how many thousands of workers in France or Britain will
have jobs at the expense of voters like you and me.
[Ref. 48:p. 117]
88
The benefits of globalization are diverse. Globalization
improves corporate cash flow by replacing lost or declining
DoD sales with exports. Excess capacity is reduced and
efficiency is improved, resulting in lower prices to the U.S.
Government. Globalization also keeps production lines open
that may have otherwise been closed and keeps skilled workers
employed. This is especially true in certain sectors, such as
tanks and maritime patrol aircraft, in which no DoD purchases
are planned for years.
The impact of globalization on our national security
continues to be a concern. Critics of globalization cite
France, which exports more than half of its weapons, as an
example. In 1991, Saddam Hussein turned his French-made
weapons against French and other NATO troops during Operation
Desert Storm [Ref. 47:p. 100]. The Defense Conversion
Commission believes decisions regarding defense exports should
be based on a foreign policy and national security analysis,
which must also include the impact of the decision on the
defense industrial base [Ref. l:p. 35].
A world-wide economic down-cycle and the end of the Cold
War has exacerbated the recession in the arms market. Many
foreign defense companies are feeling the same pressures as
U.S. defense companies and are also pursuing globalization
strategies. Many U.S. firms are finding they cannot compete
against many of the modern, low-cost, and often subsidized,
89
foreign companies. These pressures make it increasingly
difficult to export defense products.
Despite these pressures, U.S. sales to the Middle East
have jumped from $347 million in 1987 to $3 billion in 1991.
Some experts say that Middle East nations spent more than 11
percent of their collective Gross National Product on arms
between 1972 and 1988, compared with 2.3 percent in Latin
America, and 6.3 percent in Asia. [Ref. 48:p. 116] Table XXI
lists the largest foreign buyers of U.S. weapons between 2
August 1990, the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, and 22
February 1993 [Ref. 47:p. 100].
TABLE XXI: LARGEST FOREIGN BUYERS OF U.S. WEAPONS 1990-93
Defense Sales
Rank Country ($billion)
1 Saudi Arabia $25.9
2 Kuwait 7.4
3 Taiwan 6.4
4 South Korea 3.8
5 Turkey 3.1
The government continues to analyze its position
concerning foreign military sales. Joel Johnson, Vice
President of International Programs for the Aerospace
Industries Association in Washington D.C. stated:
There are signs that the [Pentagon] is beginning to
recognize that exports can be important to hold down unit
costs and even to keep production lines open. As a
consequence, there is a new interest in actually
supporting U.S. industry in its sales efforts. [Ref.
49:p. 117]
The next section examines these companies and highlights some
of the significant events in the global market.
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B. DEFENSE COMPANIES IN PURSUIT OF GLOBALIZATION
Table XXII provides a listing of the top ten defense
companies in the world based upon 1992 foreign contract awards
[Ref. 49:p. 381. All ten companies are American and are among
the top 15 companies analyzed in this thesis. Despite being
leading exporters of defense products, only the six bold
listed companies are aggressively seeking to expand their
global market share.
TABLE XXII: FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ($million)
Division/Subsidiary U.S.
Receiving Most FY1992 Market
Rank Company Contract Dollars Awards Share
1 General Dynamics Fort Worth Division $1,638 23.22t
2 McDonnell Douglas McDonnell Douglas 482 6.83
3 Lockheed Missiles & Space 353 5.00
4 General Electric Aircraft Engine Group 351 4.97
5 Raytheon Missile Systems 333 4.72
6 GM-Hughes Defense Electronics 306 4.33
7 Martin Marietta Electronics & Missiles 252 3.57
8 Boeing Boeing Aerospace 222 3.15
9 United Technologies Pratt & Whitney 198 2.81
10 Grumman Grumman Aerospace 143 2.03
Note: Rankings are based on prime contracts of $25,000 or
more for military R&D, services, and products sold to
non-U.S. governments
Source: Government Executive.
In addition to the six listed in bold above, Rockwell and
Loral are also expanding globally. Table XXIII outlines those
companies which have chosen to pursue the globalization
strategy. The classification is somewhat subjective due to
the lack of consistency between corporate reports. However,
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based on data supplied by 1992 annual reports and Government
Executive's annual survey of defense companies, all eight of
the globalizing companies have shown an upward trend in
foreign military sales. The eight globalizing companies have
averaged in excess of five percent growth per year in foreign
military sales as a percentage of total defense spending since
1990. The remaining companies showed negative growth of one
percent annually in global sales. General Dynamics was the
only other top defense company showing an upward trend.
However, the 1992 sale of its Fort Worth fighter plane
business will reduce its U.S. market share from 23.22 percent
to roughly 3.00 percent [Ref. 50:p. 19].
TABLE XXIII: DEFENSE COMPANIES PURSUING A GLOBALIZATION
STRATEGY
GLOBALIZATION STRATEGY
Primary Secondary
Boeing Loral
GM-Hughes Electronics Martin Marietta
Rockwell McDonnell Douglas
United Technologies Raytheon
Loral and Martin Marietta are pursuing the globalization
strategy secondary to their primary strategy of expansion.
McDonnell Douglas and Raytheon are pursuing the globalization
strategy secondary to their primary strategies of
rationalization and diversification, respectively. The
following paragraphs identify some of the recent highlights of
the globalization strategy pursued by these companies.
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1. Boeing
Boeing claims the title as "the world's number one
aerospace company and America's leading exporter." [Ref.
50:p. 3] Receiving over 50 percent of its sales from foreign
nations, Boeing's commercial business is hoping its expansion
into the Pacific Rim will boost this figure. Boeing's
military exports are focused on its E-3 Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Built on a Boeing 707
airframe, the AWACS system is used by Saudi Arabia, Great
Britain, and France. The system's interoperability with NATO
aircraft systems and the new AWACS 767 airframe offer the
potential for additional growth. Boeing's F-22 program and
the Avenger air defense missile system have recently received
export licenses to the Netherlands and Turkey. [Ref. 51:p.
12]
2. GM-Hughes Electronics
From 1986 to 1992, sales of defense-related
products and services to international customers increased 14
pe-rcent from $589 million to $670 million, with exports to the
Middle East representing over 40 percent of 1992 international
sales [Ref. 22:p. 22]. The company's airborne radar systems
constitute 18 percent of defense electronics revenue and are
in many of the world's most powerful aircraft, including the
F-14, F-15, F/A-18, AV-8B, U-2R, and B-2. As international
sales of these tactical aircraft continue to grow, GM-Hughes
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Electronics is strategically positioned to upgrade these
systems.
In 1992 Kuwait became the 24th nation to buy the
company's air defense system in 30 years. Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and China have also ordered air defense systems. GM-Hughes
Electronics also provides computer hardware for the F-16, a
popular foreign aircraft, and laser rangefinders and sight
stabilization systems for the MlA2 tank, recently selected by
Kuwait. In an effort to better position itself for
international sales, GM-Hughes Electronics established three
new business units in 1992--Hughes Europe, Hughes
Asia/Pacific, and Hughes Middle East. [Ref. 22:p. 22]
3. Rockwell
Rockwell has seen international revenues from its
defense electronics division rise from five percent in 1987 to
25 percent in 1993. Rockwell's expansion into the Pacific Rim
has been the driving force behind the explosive international
growth. To date, over 50,000 Hellfire missiles have been
produced for Far East nations. Rockwell has also signed a
memorandum of understanding with Goldstar Corporation of South
Korea covering the potential production of the GBU-15 and AGM-
130 standoff weapons. Rockwell Systems Australia is the
contractor for the combat systems integrator for the Royal
Australian Navy's new Collins class submarine and the Royal
Australian Air Force's P-3C upgrade and has won, over $1.2
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billion in contracts from Australia since 1986. [Ref. 52:pp.
29-301
4. United Technologies
United Technologies' Pratt & Whitney division has
17 commercial engine partnerships with companies in eight
countries in Europe and Asia. Pratt & Whitney's FlO0-PW-229
engine will power the South Korean Fighter Program and the
Saudi Arabian F-15, while its Fl00-PW-220 engine will power
Taiwan's F-16 fighter jets. International orders are an
important element in the company's plan to maintain production
readiness as it prepares to compete for the F-22 advanced
tactical fighter engine contract later this decade. [Ref.
18:p. 15]
United Technologies' Sikorsky subsidiary received
ten percent of its revenues from international sales in the
mid-1980s and foresees 40 percent later this decade. Sikorsky
has received helicopter orders from Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, Greece and Mexico, and is pursuing follow-up orders
in Columbia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. Sikorsky is
currently negotiating contracts with Kuwait, Brazil, and the
Netherlands. [Ref. 18:p. 17]
5. Loral
Loral's foreign sales have soared from $188
million in 1990 to $595 million in 1992 [Ref. 25:p. 39].
Loral has at least one significant electronic combat system in
each of the world's leading aircraft- -F/A-18, F-15, and F-16--
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presenting significant international growth opportunities as
the sale of tactical aircraft continues. Loral's ALQ-178
electronic counter measure systems protect Israeli and Turkish
F-16s. Spain and several Middle Eastern nations have
expressed an interest in Loral's Long-Range Oblique
Photography System (LOROPS), an aerial reconnaissance system
being installed in F/A-18s. Six countries are already
deploying Loral's Chaparral air-defense system. [Ref. 25:p.
17-18]
6. Martin Marietta
Martin Marietta's acquisition of GE-Aerospace
brings with it substantial international business in fields
such as air-defense radars and the new AN/MPS-39 Multiple
Object Tracking Radar System. As the principal subcontractor
to Raytheon for Patriot Missile bodies, electronic
subassemblies, and launchers, Martin Marietta has benefitted
by an explosive surge in overseas buying as well as from a
1992 contract to develop an advanced propulsion system to
improve the Patriot's range and speed. Additionally, more
than 100 long-range air-defense and air traffic control radars
are in use or on order by more than 12 countries on four
continents. [Ref. 27:pp. 6-7]
7. McDonnell Douglas
McDonnell Douglas is relying heavily on foreign
requests to upgrade existing products, such as the F-15, F/A-
18, and AV-8B. Recent orders by Spain and Italy for the AV-8B
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Harrier II Plus, a new radar-equipped version of the Harrier,
by Finland for the F/A-18, and by Saudi Arabia for the F-15E
will keep production lines open into the late 1990s. The
C..udi F-15E sale is expected to save 40,000 jobs and be worth
$13 billion. The United Arab Emirates, Greece, and several
other countries have ordered AH-64 Apache helicopters which
will sustain production lines into 1996. Foreign sales are
critical since Army procurement of the Apache has ended and
production ends in mid-1994 for the U.S. Air Force F-15.
[Ref. 48:p. 118]
8. Raytheon
Although Raytheon's foreign sales have only
increased modestly in recent years, the company remains a
strong player in the international market. To enhance their
ability to compete for new Middle East business, Raytheon
opened a marketing office in Dubai in 1992. Total Patriot
missile revenues from sales to Saudi Arabia alone have
exceeded $1.5 billion [Ref. 53:p. 2] . Contracts for technical
assistance, training, and logistics support for the Patriot
and Hawk surface-to-air missile system offer continued growth
in the future.
The events described above span many nations and
present a picture of an increasingly global market for defense
products. The international environment is changing rapidly.
As defense companies expand globally, new forms of cooperation
are developing, including subcontracting and strategic
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partnerships. Expansion overseas is new territory for many
companies, but territory they appear willing to explore.
Although not intended to be all inclusive, Table XXIV provides
a summary of the major highlights of the globalization
strategy. The next section of the chapter will examine the
factors that have shaped the evolution of the globalization
strategy.
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TABLE XXIV: DEFENSE INDUSTRY GLOBALIZATION HIGHLIGHTS
GM-Hughes Electronics
1992: -Established Hughes Europe, Hughes Asia/Pacific, and
Hughes Middle East
-Kuwait becomes the 24th nation to buy an air
defense system from GM-Hughes in 30 years
1991: -Selected to develop and implement an air defense
system for Saudi Arabia called "Peace Shield"
Loral
1993: -Company's first sale of ALR-56M advanced radar
warning receiver to the Korean Fighter Program
Martin Marietta
1992: -Joint venture with French and German firms in
producing Counter Battery Radar (COBRA)
-First sale of AN/MPS-39 Multiple Object Tracking
Radar System to British Ministry of Defense
McDonnell Douglas
1993: -Spain orders AV-8B Harrier II Plus
1992: -Italy orders AV-SB Harrier II Plus
-Finland and Saudi Arabia order F/A-18 and F-15,
respectively
Raytheon
1993: -Patriot Missile sales to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
1992: -Opens a marketing office in Dubai
-$1.03 billion Patriot Missile sale to Saudi Arabia
United Technologies
1993: -Pratt & Whitney selected to provide engines for
Saudi Arabian F-15s
1992: -Pratt & Whitney selected to provide engines for
Taiwan's F-16 A/B fighters
-Sikorsky selected to produce 95 Black Hawks for
Turkey
1991: -Pratt & Whitney selected to provide engines for
South Korean Air Force
Source: Wall Street Journal Index; 1992 Annual Reports
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C. FACTORS SHAPING STRATEGY SELECTION
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to analyze
the factors that have shaped the globalization strategy.
These factors are illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 14.
First, a company must consider whether or not it wishes to
maintain its current defense spending exposure. Second,
companies must consider their ability to compete globally.
Finally, demand for the company's product overseas must be
monitored. Although certain factors will indicate a company
should globalize, the interaction of all factors is the final
determinant in strategy selection.
Factor 1
Do I wish to maintain NO
current defense Downsize
exposure?
Factor 2 YES
Is my company well NO Pursue alternate
positioned to compete strategy
globally?
Factor 3 YES
Are my products NO Pursue alternate
attractive to strategy
foreign nations?
YES
IIGoaize I
Figure 14: Factors Framing the Globalization Strategy
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1. Exposure to Defense Spending
Earlier chapters indicated that those companies with
higher exposures to defense spending were more likely to
expand and to diversify. It is expected that those companies
with higher exposures are also more likely to globalize, which
is a form of both expansion and diversification. It involves
diversifying into foreign markets and expanding current
production. The impact of defense spending reductions is more
extreme to highly exposed companies. Foreign sales may be an
effective method of replacing declining DoD revenues. Lesser
exposed companies are more likely to downsize their operations
or exit the defense market completely.
Table XXV lists the top DoD contractors based on 1991
defense and space revenues as a percentage of total revenues
[Ref. 10:p. 60). Globalizing companies range in exposure from
Martin Marietta to Boeing. Grumman and General Dynamics have
chosen to downsize and Northrop's international sales have
been negligible in the past. Although Lockheed remains a
global leader in defense exports, the company's focus of the
future is on reinforcing its core aircraft business and
diversifying into commercial markets. As was found with
previous strategies, exposure to defense spending does not
prove to be a good predictor of globalization. Additional
factors must be considered.
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TABLE XXV: EXPOSURE TO DEFENSE SPENDING
Company Percent Category
Grumman 90.8 Extremely Exposed
Northrop 89.6
Martin Marietta 85.6
Lockheed 85.0
General Dynamics 84.6
Loral 75.3
McDonnell Douglas 55.1 Highly Exposed
Raytheon 53.9
GM-Hughes Electronics 49.6
Litton Industries 46.9
Rockwell 43.6
United Technologies 25.9 Moderately Exposed
Westinghouse Electric 25.4
Boeing 19.9
General Electric 12.3 Minimally Exposed
Note: Percent = 1991 defense and space revenues as a
percentage of total revenues
Source: DRI/McGraw-Hill
2. Ability to Compete Globally
To be competitive in a global market, companies must
have the infrastructure to handle the additional risks and
requirements. International operations and foreign sales
carry significant risks such as fluctuations in currency
values, domestic and foreign policy regulations, embargoes,
hostilities, and exchange restrictions. Many companies hedge
against such risks using insurance, contract provisions,
government-guarantees, and progress payments. Additionally,
many defense products need licenses to comply with the Export
Administration Act, Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, and
Arms Exports Control Act of 1976 (formerly the Foreign
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Military Sales Act). Frequently companies may utilize sales
representatives and distributors in connection with foreign
sales. [Ref. 54:pp. 8-9]
Given the additional risks and requirements of foreign
sales, it is expected that those companies with higher
exposure to foreign sales, both commercial and defense, will
be more likely to pursue a globalization strategy. Those
companies with a higher exposure already have the
infrastructure in place to further expand overseas. It is
likely that those companies with less exposure lack the
expertise and management experience for exports to have a
dramatic effect on revenues.
Table XXVI lists the top DoD contractors based on 1992
foreign sales as a percentage of total sales. The table
suggests that those companies which are minimally exposed to
foreign sales are not likely to pursue a globalization
strategy. This explains why Lockheed, Grumman and Northrop
all have opted not to expand globally, despite their high
exposure to defense spending. While exposure to foreign sales
seems to be an adequate predictor of who will not globalize,
it is a weak indicator of who will globalize. Foreign demand
for a company's product will be the final determinant.
3. Foreign Demand for Products
The threat of global superpower war has been replaced
by regional disputes over sovereignty, borders, and religion.
Jane's Defense Weekly's annual survey reported 73 *u'flashpoints
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or hot spots" around the world in January 1993, up from 12 in
1992. These hot spots included 26 wars or insurrections, 23
areas of potential conflict, and 24 areas of tension. [Ref.
55:pp. 2-3) These changes in the international political
arena will generate increased spending on tactical weapons and
systems, both at home and abroad, vice spending on strategic
weapons.
TABLE XXVI: 1992 EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN SALES
Company Percent Category
Boeing 57.9 Extremely Exposed
General Dynamics 47.2 Highly Exposed
United Technologies 38.0
McDonnell Douglas 28.7 Moderately Exposed
Litton Industries 27.6
Rockwell 27.5
General Electric 21.6
Loral 20.6
Raytheon 18.7
GM-Hughes Electronics 18.0
Martin Marietta 17.2
Westinghouse Electric 16.1
Lockheed 8.4 Minimally Exposed
Grumman 6.1
Northrop N/A
Notes: (1) Percent = 1992 foreign sales as a ptfLcentage of
total sales
(2) Lockheed data excludes Fort Worth division; data
is included in General Dynamics' figure.
(3) General Dynamics data are approximated based on
1992 foreign contract awards
(4) Northrop's foreign sales are negligible and not
reported by the company
Source: 1992 Annual Reports
Those defense companies with a strong presence in
tactical aircraft and electronic systems are most likely to
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benefit from this new climate. Far East and Middle East
nations continue to drive demand for these products. Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas, and United Technologies will benefit by
strong demand for aircraft and aircraft engines. Lockheed's
purchase of General Dynamics' Fort Worth Division and the F-16
program will likely lead to increased globalization in the
near future. Grumman's F-14, A-6, and E-2 programs are
outdated and demand for more modern aircraft has limited
overseas demand for the company's products. GM-Hughes
Electronics and Loral produce sophisticated electronics and
combat systems for many of the world's most powerful aircraft
and are also likely to benefit.
The proven effectiveness of air defense systems during
Operation Desert Storm has driven foreign demand for products
from Martin Marietta and Raytheon. The Patriot and Hawk
surface-to-air missile systems are battle-tested and popular
overseas. Upgrades and further support contracts offer the
potential for continued growth in air defense systems.
However, declining world demand for armored vehicles
and strategic missiles has essentially closed off foreign
markets for some companies. Although General Dynamics' Land
Systems Division has seen overseas orders for its MlAl and
MIA2 tanks surge in the last few years, armored vehicle
procurement has essentially stopped. General Dynamics expects
to continue producing tank components for foreign nations
until FY 1996 [Ref. 2:p. 3-18] Accordingly, the Land Systems
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division is for sale and pursuing overseas customers is a
short-term tactical decision until such a sale is complete.
The U.S. shipbuilding industry also faces bleak
prospects at home and abroad. Building warships for exports
does not appear to be a viable alternative since U.S.
shipyards find it difficult to compete against the cheaper,
often subsidized foreign shipyards. Demand for ships, both
military and commercial, is also fading as 1992 showed the
first decline in the number of ships on order or under
construction in the world since 1987 (Ref. 5 6:p. 21-1]. Since
the 1960s, fewer than 15 warships have been built in U.S.
shipyards for foreign navies [Ref. 57:p. 28]. Litton's
Ingalls Shipbuilding subsidiary has the only significant
contract for construction of a foreign ship in a U.S. shipyard
[Ref. 5 8:p. 11].
Finally, Northrop's B-2 and MX Peacekeeper programs
accounted for nearly 60 percent of its 1992 revenues. The
company's presence in strategic weapons has and will continue
to hinder globalization. The emphasis on tactical weaponry is
evidenced by the Peacekeeper's sharp reduction in sales, from
$359 million to $46 million between 1988 and 1992. [Ref.
41:p. 29]
4. Summary of Globalization Factors
Given the current world conditions regarding defense
spending and military tensions, the new defense market is
becoming increasingly globalized with an emphasis on tactical
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weapons. Of particular interest is the fact that Northrop,
given its high exposure to defense spending, has chosen not to
globalize, while Boeing, given its moderate exposure, has
chosen to globalize. The Northrop and Boeing examples
illustrate that exposure to foreign sales is perhaps a better
factor in determining which companies are not likely to expand
globally. However, neither factor proved to be a good
predictor of which company would likely globalize. The demand
for a company's product will continue to be the driving force
behind the globalization strategy and is the only adequate
predictor of the globalization strategy.
The previous three chapters have explored strategies
for companies with the desire to expand or maintain their
businesses. The final strategy offers an alternative that is
also becoming increasing popular--rationalization or
downsizing. Several companies are downsizing to focus on core
business competencies and several appear to be exiting the
defense market completely.
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VI. RATIONALIZATION--FOCUSING ON CORE BUSINESSES
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF RATIONALIZATION
Rationalization is a business strategy that combines both
downsizing and consolidation. Downsizing is the shrinking of
individual operations and consolidation is reducing the number
of business units or operating segments. Defense companies
are downsizing both their defense businesses and commercial
businesses in order to focus on core business strengths. This
chapter will address the rationalization strategy and its many
advantages. Succeeding sections will focus on the companies
that are pursuing the strategy and the factors that have
guided management's decision to pursue such a strategy.
As represented by Figure 15, rationalization is an attempt
to manage for cash. Unprofitable or low growth businesses are
sold and cash is reinvested into core businesses or returned
to shareholders. William Anders, the chief proponent of
rationalization, believes that burdening a business with
unnecessary assets reduces returns and adds unnecessary costs,
making the company less attractive to investors and customers.
Anders favors a more "businesslike" approach to focusing on
what a company does best. [Ref. 7:p. 9].
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* 2
DefenseLOW 5
5 4 3 2 1
WEAK Competitive Position STRONG
Figure 15: The General Dynamics Strategic Matrix
Companies need to be smaller, stronger, and more flexible.
Many industry analysts question the logic of traditional
strategies such as commercial diversification and
globalization. They argue that the current environment does
not encourage growing faster than the industry, but in
shrinking faster than the industry. [Ref. 32:p. 31)
Downsizing enables firms to shrink the size of their
operations and focus on their critical mass. Critical mass is
the "proper amount and balance of work and resources necessary
to produce and support high-quality, affordable weapons
systems." [Ref. 59:p. 161 Inefficiencies and excess capacity
are eliminated. Rationalization of "noncore" assets
eliminates management diversion towards business units that
are not considered core strengths.
Nearly canceled due to soaring costs, the F-22 is a prime
example of the benefits of pursuing this strategy. A joint
venture between General Dynamics, Lockheed, and Boeing, the F-
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22 came under increasing pressure from the Pentagon and
Congress. As demand for other defense products fell, the F-
22's share of corporate overhead steadily increased. However,
General Dynamics' sale of its fighter division to Lockheed
resulted in one less overhead bill and helped bring costs
under control. Critical mass was achieved, the government
realized lower prices, and consolidation in the industry took
place. [Ref. 4:p. 94]
A substantial portion of the proceeds from divestitures is
also returned to shareholders. Between January 1991 and
October 1993, General Dynamics, the first major defense
company to aggressively downsize, has seen its stock price
soar from $25 to nearly $100 per share. General Dynamics
declared three special dividends in the last year of $20, $18,
and $12 per share. Based on 31 million outstanding shares,
General Dynamics has returned approximately $1.6 billion to
shareholders or $50 per share [Ref. 60:p. 7]. William Anders
has also repurchased more than $1 billion of General Dynamics
stock [Ref. 4:p. 94]. In an interview with Fortune, Anders
outlined his feelings on returning excess cash to
shareholders:
Who can best decide how to reinvest in America? The.
answer is the American people. They are the people whose
investment provides the capability for us to do government
business. [Ref. 19:p. 57]
One of the criticisms of this strategy is that not all
divestitures are in the best interests of the defense
industrial base, and are merely a reshuffling of excess
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capacity. Other critics argue that rationalization is done
for short-term financial gain at the expense of long-term
viability. Despite these criticisms, buyers continue to
surface and rationalization continues to move forward. The
next section of the thesis highlights some of the most
significant events associated with rationalization efforts.
B. DEFENSE COMPANIES IN PURSUIT OF RATIONALIZATION
Table XXVII provides a summary of the top defense
companies pursuing a rationalization strategy. The companies
were selected based upon their commitment to focus on core
businesses. All six of the rationalizing companies have
publicly stated their downsizing strategies. GE is downsizing
to focus on its commercial businesses, while the remaininc,
companies are downsizing to focus on core defense
capabilities. Over the past three years, these six companies
have each seen revenues fall an average of $2.5 billion. This
reduction is a combination of downsizing and the unprofitable
businesses within these companies that will be discussed
later. The nine non-rationalizing defense companies have
actually seen revenues climb an average of nearly $300 million
each since 1990. With the exception of Westinghouse Electric,
all of the companies listed in Table XXVII are pursuing
rationalization as their primary strategy. Westinghouse's
dowinsizing has thus far been limited to its financial
services business and is secondary to its diversification
strategy, as outlined in Chapter IV.
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TABLE XXVII: DEFENSE COMPANIES PURSUING A RATIONALIZATION
STRATEGY
RATIONALIZATION STRATEGY
Primary Secondary
General Dynamics Westinghouse Electric
General Electric
Grumman
Litton Industries
McDonnell Douglas
1. General Dynamics
General Dynamics has been aggressively downsizing its
operations since January 1991. Its major divestitures include
its missile business to GM-Hughes Electronics, electronics
business (now known as GDE Systems Inc.) to The Carlysle
Group, Cessna commercial aircraft business to Textron, and
data systems division to Computer Sciences Corporation. In
October 1993, General Dynamics announced that it is
negotiating with Martin Marietta concerning the sale of
General Dynamics' space-launch business. If completed,
General Dynamics will be left with only its tank manufacturing
plants (MlAl and M1A2 tanks) and submarine business (Trident
and Seawolf submarines). Both of these units are also for
sale. Talks concerning FMC's acquisition of General Dynamics'
Land Systems Division ended in 1992 and no prospective buyers
have surfaced since. However, recent Pentagon initiatives to
guarantee the financial health and manufacturing capability
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for these two sectors may improve General Dynamics' ability to
attract a buyer [Ref.61:p. Cl].
2. General Electric
Jack Welch, Chairman and CEO of GE, has stipulated
that the company's business must be either number one or two
in their markets. Dubbed "Trader Jack," Welch has divested
289 lackluster businesses, raising $10 billion and spent $19
billion on what he hoped would be better ones since 1981 [Ref.
29:p. 24]. In November 1992, GE's aerospace business was
combined with Martin Marietta, creating the world's largest
aerospace electronics company. GE kept its defense aircraft
engine business since it complements its commercial aircraft
engine business. The future of GE's federal contract work is
in aircraft engines, where revenues from the Pentagon fell
from 40 percent in 1990 to 33 percent in 1992 [Ref. 62:p.341.
3. Grumman
With a firm commitment to remain in the aerospace
business, which constitutes approximately 70 percent of
revenues, Grumman is divesting unprofitable and noncore
businesses. Grumman considers these businesses to be
"distractions to management." [Ref. 63:p. 2] Grumman has
exited the fire truck business, sold Grumman Data Systems
Institute and is discontinuing its reinsurance subsidiary,
Paumanock Insurance Company, Ltd. In an effort to make its
core business stronger and more competitive, Grumman
consolidated its aircraft and electronics businesses into one
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operating group. These divestitures and corporate
restructuring have enabled the company to increase its
quarterly dividend, strengthen its balance sheet, and reduce
its total debt nearly 70 percent in two years [Ref: 64:p. 1].
4. Litton Industries
Rather than selling off pieces of its business,
Litton's unique approach is to establish a new and independent
company that will concentrate solely on the company's growing
commercial businesses. Litton's commercial spinoff will be
called Western Atlas, Inc. and will include Litton's resource
exploration services and industrial automation segments.
These businesses account for approximately $2 billion in
annual revenue. Management believes that commercial and
defense businesses need different strategies and this split
will allow management to better focus on each tvsk. Litton
Industries will maintain its advanced electronics and marine
engineering and production segments. [Ref. 65:p. 2]
5. McDonnell Douglas
Despite facing tough times because of the airline
recession, Chairman and CEO John F. McDonnell declared that
"Our future is aerospace" and is shedding business segments
not number one of two in their field [Ref. 40:p. 5].
McDonnell Douglas believes that it is number one or number two
in combat aircraft and missiles, space, and electronics, and
believes it is number one in transport aircraft [Ref. 40:p.
5.. Already sold are Telecheck Services, Inc., the company's
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data processing assets, McDonnell Douglas Systems
International, Visual Simulation Systems, and its North
American Field Service business. McDonnell Douglas Finance
Corporation, a world leader in aircraft and equipment leasing,
shed 22 percent of its assets in 1992 to focus on its core
markets [Ref. 40:p. 18].
The company's Douglas Aircraft subsidiary is running
a distant third behind Boeing and Airbus in the commercial
airline market. The failure of Douglas to find a strategic
partner, most notably Taiwan Aerospace, means that Douglas is
now considered "non-core". DRI is predicting that McDonnell
Douglas will exit the commercial aircraft business by the end
of the decade. [Ref. 32:p. 22]
In order to better focus on its core defense
businesses, McDonnell Douglas consolidated its six defense
businesses into two divisions--the Eastern Division, which
includes combat aircraft, missiles, and helicopters, and the
Western Division, which includes space systems, electronics
systems, and Douglas Military (C-17 program). Reports earlier
this year said McDonnell Douglas was in preliminary talks on
the possible sale of its missile and helicopter businesses, as
well as its laser systems division. McDonnell Douglas
Aerospace makes the Harpoon anti-ship missile, the Standoff
Land Attack Missile, and Tomohawk cruise missile, as well as
the Apache and MD helicopters. [Ref. 66:p. 5]
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6. Westinghouse Electric
Michael H. Jordan, a former PepsiCo executive, was
hired on June 30, 1993 to improve Westinghouse Electric's poor
operating performance. He is divesting financially troubled
businesses and focusing on five core areas: power systems,
electric systems, environmental services, temperature control
devices, and broadcasting. The annual report claims that,
"These are markets we understand, serving customers we know,
involving technology where we are strong." [Ref. 45:pp. 4-5]
As part of its restructuring, Westinghouse has identified its
distribution and control business unit, Westinghouse Electric
Supply Company, The Knoll Group, and Westinghouse Communities
for divestiture. Asset sales for Westinghouse Financial
Services, Inc. (WFSI) commenced in February 1991 and are
nearly complete. [Ref. 32:p. 87].
While most defense companies are consolidating plants
and laying off personnel, the companies analyzed in this
chapter are also reducing their number of businesses and
reshaping their business mix through divestitures. Although
not intended to be all inclusive, Table XXVIII provides a
summary of the major defense industry rationalization
highlights. The next section of the chapter will examine the
factors that have framed the rationalization strategy.
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TABLE XXVIII: DEFENSE INDUSTRY RATIONALIZATION HIGHLIGHTS
General Dynamics
1993: -Announces plans to sell space division to Martin
Marietta
-Completes sale of Fort Worth division to Lockheed
1992: -Sells missile business to Hughes Aircraft Company
-Sells electronics division to The Carlysle Group
-Sells Cessna aircraft business to Textron
-Sells data systems division to Computer Sciences
Corporation
-Sells American Overseas Marine Corporation to
International Shipbuilding Corp.
General Electric
1993: -Sells aerospace unit to Martin Marietta
Grumman
1992: -Combines aircraft and electronic units into one
operating group
-Sells Grumman Data Systems Institute
-Announces plans to discontinue Paumanock Insurance
Co., Ltd
-Exits the fire truck business
Litton Industries
1993: -Announces plans to spinoff separate commercial
company
McDonnell Douglas
1993: -Sells McDonnell Douglas Information Systems
International
-Sells Visual Simulations Systems business
1992: -Consolidates six defense businesses into two
-Announces laser systems business and McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Company are for sale
-Sells Telecheck Services, Inc.
1990: -Sells North American Field Services business
Westinghouse Electric
1993: -Announces broadcasting business is for sale
1991: -Begins liquidation of Westinghouse Financial
Services Inc.
Source: Wall Street Journal Index; 1992 Annual Report
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C. FACTORS SHAPING STRATEGY SELECTION
Rationalization should be expected under two scenarios.
First, those companies which have minimal exposure to defense
spending are more likely to pursue such a strategy. Second,
those companies which own or operate business units that do
not reinforce or take advantage of the company's core
competencies are more likely to downsize. Unlike previous
strategies where the interaction of all factors was the final
determinant of strategy selection, these two factors are
considered separately, as illustrated in Figure 16.
Rationalizing companies need to only satisfy the criteria of
one of the factors, not necessarily both. The companies will
therefore also be analyzed separately, based on the factor
that guided their selection of the rationalization strategy.
Factor 1 Factor 2
Do I want to decrease Is my core business(es)
my exposure to defense distracted by low growth
spending through downsizing? or unprofitable non-core
businesses?
No Seek alternative No
strategy
Yes RATIONALIZEj Ye
Figure 16: Factors Framing the Rationalization Strategy
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1. Exposure to Defense Spending
As was discussed in previous chapters, defense
companies must first consider their exposure to defense
spending. Companies with higher exposure are oriented towards
government unique accounting practices, standards, and
specifications, and audit and oversight roles, thus making
their strategy selection less flexible. These companies are
likely to maintain or increase their defense investments.
Given the cutbacks in defense spending, it is expected that
those companies which have less exposure are more likely to
downsize or reduce their investment in defense.
Table XXIX lists the top DoD contractors based on 1991
defense and space revenues, as a percentage of total revenues
[Ref. 10:p. 60]. Since the two factors are considered
separately, only GE is listed in bold, indicating it is the
only top defense company rationalizing in order to reduce
defense exposure. The data supports the concept that
minimally exposed companies will downsize their defense
businesses. However, companies with higher defense
investments are downsizing to focus on core defense
businesses--the focus of the next section. Exposure to
defense spending is therefore only a good predictor of which
companies will likely reduce their defense investments.
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TABLE XXIX: EXPOSURE TO DEFENSE SPENDING
Company Percent Category
Grumman 90.8 Extremely Exposed
Northrop 89.6
Martin Marietta 85.6
Lockheed 85.0
General Dynamics 84.6
Loral 75.3
McDonnell Douglas 55.1 Highly Exposed
Raytheon 53.9
GM-Hughes Electronics 49.6
Litton Industries 46.9
Rockwell 43.6
United Technologies 25.9 Moderately Exposed
Westinghouse Electric 25.4
Boeing 19.9
General Electric 12.3 Minimally Exposed
Note: Percent = 1991 defense and space revenues as a
percentage of total revenues
Source: DRI/McGraw-Hill
2. Core Versus Non-core Business Competencies
The previous section indicated that GE reduced its
defense investment in order to concentrate on its core
commercial businesses. Likewise, the remaining five companies
are downsizing to focus on core defense businesses. It is
expected that those companies with financially troubled,
unprofitable, or low growth non-core businesses will be most
likely to pursue the rationalization strategy. Non-core
businesses are considered those that generate less than 30
percent of total revenues. These non-core businesses are
distractions to management and drags on corporate earnings.
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General Dynamics began by shedding a series of
commercial businesses that did not reinforce its core defense
businesses. Yet General Dynamics also faced extreme
uncertainty in its major defense businesses. The maturity of
the F-16 program and uncertainty about the future of the
Multi-Role Fighter and the A/FX raised questions about the
future viability of the Fort Worth Division [Ref. 67:p. 30].
F-16 production was also stricken with quality c ctrol
problems that led to production delays. Current order
backlogs fur the MIA1 and M1A2 main battle tanks are only
expected to keep production lines open until 1995. The
Electric Boat Division's submarine business is a victim of
budget cuts and the space systems segment is facing increased
competition at home and abroad. [Ref. 68:p. 37]
Grumman's principal defense products are mature and
facing declining revenue prospects. The A-6 Intruder line
shut down in 1992 after 30 years of production, the EA-6B is
in its fifth generation, the last new F-14 Tomcat was
delivered in 1992 ending a 23 year production run, and there
was no production funding in the FY 1993 budget for the E-2C
Hawkeye [Ref. 63:p. 3]. Grumman is divesting non-aerospace
businesses and is using the cash to pay off its debt and to
fund next generation defense systems. These systems include
Joint STARS, a battle management and control system that
performed well in Operation Desert Storm, and the Air Force's
Follow-on Early Warning System (FEWS), a space-based system
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that detects and tracks missiles and launchers, and the AX,
the Navy's next generation attack aircraft that is scheduled
to replace the A-6. Grumman is teamed with TRW in the FEWS
project and Boeing and Lockheed in the AX project.
McDonnell Douglas is facing a weak commercial airline
market, a troubled C-17 Globemaster III program, and weak
performance by its complementary businesses. In 1992 the
company took nearly $400 million in losses for the C-17 and
was troubled with massive cost and schedule overruns, as well
as performance problems [Ref. 33:p. 791. Operating earnings
from the company's complementary businesses, including
McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, have fallen from over
$100 million in 1990 to just over $20 million in 1992 [Ref.
40:p. 18].
Westinghouse Electric has seen revenues erode in the
past several years since many of its businesses are driven by
the business cycle. Westinghouse Financial Services, Inc.
(WFSI) has also been a drag on earnings. It was estimated
that nearly 40 percent of WFSI's $10 billion portfolio was
considered "troubled or potentially troubled". Financial
segment revenues have fallen more than 30 percent since 1990
and only the company's power systems division has shown an
uptrend in revenues since 1990. [Ref. 32:pp. 87-89]
Litton Industries is the exception to the above two
factors. The company is neither minimally exposed nor is it
troubled by unprofitable or low growth business segments.
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Only Litton's advanced electronics business has shown flat
earnings, while the remaining three businesses have all shown
sharply rising sales figures. Litton's downsizing is based
upon management's vision of two independent companies, both
strong in their respective businesses. By shedding the
commercial businesses, Litton can better concentrate on its
advanced electronics segment and core defense capabilities.
Excluding GE and Litton, all of the rationalizing
companies have been plagued by low growth or unprofitable
businesses that have distracted management from their core
businesses. The remaining top defense companies have all
shown strength in most of their non-core businesses. Of the
19 non-core business segments operated by the non-
rationalizing companies, only four have shown a reduction in
revenues since 1990 and only Northrop's services and
electronics businesses have shown a reduction in excess of ten
percent. Put in perspective, WFSI alone saw revenues decline
30 percent since 1990 and in 1991 wrote off more than $1.7
billion in troubled assets [Ref. 32:p. 87]. It is evident
that those companies which are plagued by troubled business
segments and the need to concentrate on their core businesses
are more likely to rationalize.
3. Summary of Rationalization Factors
It appears that there is some merit to the expectation
that in today's competitive world and tight spending
environment, focusing on core businesses by downsizing and
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shedding unprofitable businesses is a rational strategy.
Streamlined and flexible companies may be the ones to survive
this new era of defense spending. Companies like GE who have
minimal exposure to defense spending are likely to rationalize
or exit the defense market completely. Those companies with
higher exposure to defense spending will likely rationalize if
management is being distracted by poorer performing business
segments. Companies such as Loral, which is highly
profitable, highly exposed to defense spending, and operates
in only one business segment (defense electronics) are the
least likely to rationalize. While these two situational
factors appear to be adequate predictors of rationalization,
Litton Industries makes it clear that management's discretion
is the ultimate factor.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The objective of this thesis was to identify and assess
the corporate strategies adopted by the top defense companies
as a result of defense budget reductions. The model used
throughout this thesis was the General Dynamics strategic
matrix pictured in Figure 17. The model stipulated four
corporate strategies: expansion, diversification,
globalization, and rationalization. The expansion and
diversification strategies were variants of the invest and
grow approach, while the globalization and rationalization
strategies represented the maintain and manage for cash
sections of the matrix. Anders argued that only the strongest
defense companies should maintain their defense investments
and none should expand. However, this thesis has shown that
the competitive position and opportunity to compensate for
reduced military business vary not only from defense sector to
defense sector, but from company to company.
Table XXX provides a summary of the strategies selected by
the major defense companies. The table indicates that each of
the strategies was pursued to nearly the same degree. Many of
the companies are pursuing multiple strategies. This is to be
expected, considering that some of the strategies are
complementary. The table also indicates that expanding
companies are also likely to diversify into commercial markets
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and globalize. Expansion and rationalization are inverse
strategies, i.e., they will not be pursued by the same
company. Litton Industries is the exception.
HIGH 1
S 2
- 4
Defense
LOW 5
5 4 3 2 1
WEAK Competitive Position STRONG
Figure 17: The General Dynamics Strategic Matrix
The table also shows that Litton and Northrop are not
pursuing anything that can be identified as a primary
strategy. These companies have pursued no single strategy
aggressively or shown no clear indication of favoring one
strategy over another. Litton is expanding its defense
business while spinning-off its commercial business and
Northrop has only recently made modest attempts at
diversification.
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TABLE XXX: SUMMARY OF DEFENSE SECTOR STRATEGIES
Company Expansion Diversify Globalize Rationalize
Boeing P
General Dynamics P
General Electric P
GM-Hughes P S P
Grumman P
Litton S S
Lockheed P S
Loral P S S
Martin Marietta P P S
McD Douglas S P
Northrop S
Raytheon S P S
Rockwell P P
United Tech P
Westinghouse P S
Note: P = Primary Strategy
S = Secondary Strategy
This thesis evaluated the factors that framed the
selection of strategies by defense company management.
Exposure to defense spending was considered in each of the
strategies. It was expected that more exposed companies would
be more likely to expand and globalize. This did not prove to
be so, as other factors were more influential in shaping
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strategy selection. Exposure to defense spending was also not
a strong predictor of diversification. Some analysts argued
that the specialized nature of doing business with the
Pentagon inhibited diversification, while others argued that
diversification is an effective way to hedge against further
spending reductions. The data did, however, indicate that
those companies which are minimally exposed will be more
likely to reduce their defense investments and less likely to
expand. Generally, these differences in defense exposure did
not tell much about how management would react to defense
spending cuts.
Exposure to foreign sales, both military and commercial,
proved to be a strong predictor of globalization. Those
companies with the global infrastructure already in place are
best able to handle the additional risks and requirements of
further globalization. With minimal exposure to defense
spending, Boeing led all of the top defense companies in
exports, which constituted 57.9 percent of 1992 sales, and is
seeking further expansion overseas. Companies such as
Northrop, which has very little international business, are
least likely to globalize. Exposure to foreign sales proved
to be an adequate predictor of who will not globalize, but was
a weak indicator of who will globalize.
Because of the lead time resulting from backlogs and
aggressive cost cutting, the financial viability of the top
defense companies is not at risk. Financial strength was
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expected to be a strong predictor of both expansion and
diversification. Liquidity and ability to incur additional
levels of debt were adequate indicators of those companies
likely to expand and diversify.
However, the financial strength of nearly all of the top
15 defense companies made it difficult to determine the impact
of weak finances on strategy implementation. As noted in
Chapter III, only Loc;'ieed and McDonnell Douglas are ranked
below B+ in financial strength by The Value Line Investment
Survey. The financial strength of these companies is
reflected in their stronger balance sheets compared to the
industry average figures. Strong stock price performance in
the defense industry reflects, at least in part, the
underlying success of the companies' post Cold War strategic
choices.
Market sector growth opportunities and existing core
competencies proved to be the best predictor of strategy
selection. Defense electronics is the only defense segment
offering the potential for growth. Those defense companies
with a strong presence in this area, such as Loral and GM-
Hughes Electronics, are most likely to expand. Likewise,
those companies with core strengths in any number of fast
growing commercial sectors are likely to diversify. Satellite
communications and advanced electronics are two such segments
that are showing rapid growth. Overseas demand drove
globalization and laggard growth in non-core business segments
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prompted rationalization and downsizing. This compatibility
between current skills and production capabilities with market
opportunities was perhaps the most influential factor in
strategy selection.
It is estimated that the number of defense suppliers has
dropped from nearly 138,000 to fewer than 40,000 between 1982
and 1987 [Ref. 69:p. 38]. No one is sure how much further it
will go. However, the top 15 defense companies have all
streamlined operations and developed strategies for guiding
them through the new defense spending environment. While no
one currently knows if these strategies will prove to be
successful, it is apparent that the new defense industrial
base will be stronger, leaner, and more flexible. In his
address to the American Defense Preparedness Association in
1992, then President Bush summed up the importance of the
defense industrial base by stating:
U.S. military strength and our defense industrial base
are inextricably linked. We cannot long maintain that
strength if we allow our defense industry to erode. We
must never forget that it is American industry that
created American might. Our military strength is
inseparable from the genius of American engineers, the
character of American industrial workers, and the
resilience of our market-based economy. [Ref. 70:p. 6]
As weapons systems become more complex and more costly,
fewer defense companies will be able to make them.
Consolidation will continue to reduce the number of defense
companies and excess capacity will be eliminated. However,
tensions and conflict throughout the world will continue to
support some level of U.S. defense spending. Demand for
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defense products will continue and those companies who survive
the current downsizing will be the ones to profit in the
future. Proper strategy selection and effective
implementation are critical not only to the survival of the
company, but to the survival of the United States as well.
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APPENDIX C
DOD SHIPBUILDING PROCUREMENT TRENDS
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APPENDIX D
ARMY WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES PROCUREMENT TRENDS
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